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Abstract
We develop a theory of marriage and fertility, distinguishing the choice to have chil-
dren from the choice of the number of children. The deep parameters of the model are
identified from the 1990 US Census. We measure voluntary and involuntary childless-
ness, and explain why (1) single women are more often childless than married women
but, when mothers, their fertility are almost similar; (2) childlessness exhibits a U-
shaped relationship with education for both single and married; (3) the relationship
between marriage rates and education is hump-shaped. We show how family patterns
have been shaped by the rise in education and wage inequality, and by the shrinking
gender wage gap.
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1 Introduction
American family patterns have changed over the twentieth century. Among those main trans-
formations, the generalization of divorce has already been widely studied (see Becker (1991)).
In this paper, we focus on the consequences of another fundamental change in the United
States: the increasing discrepancy between marriage and motherhood. Nowadays, neither
does marriage systematically imply parenthood nor does singleness mean childlessness. New
types of families, such as the DEWKs (Dually Employed With Kids), the KOOPFs (Kids of
One-Parent Families) or the DINKs (Double Income No Kids) have become more common.1
In this paper, we answer two questions. First, what are the incentives and constraints leading
individuals to one type of family rather than another? In particular, when do married couples
remain childless and when do single women become mothers? And second, how do economic
changes affect the proportion of these different family types?
The model we propose to answer these questions will be challenged on its ability to account
for three facts drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau data for the year 1990: (i) single women
are much more likely to be childless, however, when they choose to become mothers, their
fertility is almost the same as the fertility of married mothers,2 (ii) there is a U-shaped
relationship between childlessness and education both for single and for married women,
and (iii) the relationship between marriage rates and education is hump-shaped. For the
best of our knowledge, the first two facts have not been documented for both single and
married women before and nobody has provided a theory accounting for the three facts
altogether. All these facts are discussed in more detail in Section 2.
Childlessness can either be a life choice for the “child-free”, or a heavy burden for those
trapped in the impossibility of experiencing parenthood. Incorporating that parenthood
is not feasible for everyone is fundamental to explaining the facts. We claim that the U-
shaped relationship between childlessness and the education of the mother is driven by
the coexistence of involuntary and voluntary causes of childlessness. Other social sciences
have already discussed the definition of involuntary and voluntary childlessness (see Morgan
(1991) or Toulemon (1996)). A woman will be involuntarily childless if she cannot procreate
because of biological constraints leading to sterility or subfecundity; these constraints can
either be innate, or acquired. We will call the first case “natural sterility” and the second
1Each of these groups represents a different target for the marketing literature.
2We divide the population into 12 categories of education as shown in Appendix A.1. Since we use
U.S. data taken from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), singles are represented by the
category “never-married” and married by the “ever-married, spouse present”. For comments on cohabitation,
see Appendix A.2.
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“social sterility”.3 The definition of voluntary childlessness is more problematic; a restrictive
position defines as voluntarily childless, women who have never wanted to become mothers,
while a broader way to define it includes those who have never tried to become mothers. In
this paper we take the broad definition.
In the model, women remain involuntarily childless when they are either naturally sterile,
or, in the case of social sterility, they do not have the minimum amount of commodities
needed to be able to procreate. The existence of involuntary childlessness among disad-
vantaged groups in the United States is described in detail by McFalls (1979).4 He argues
that lower-income groups are more exposed to causes of subfecundity than the rest of the
population. Subfecundity factors that might affect the poor in developed countries are vene-
real diseases, malnutrition, psychopathological problems (drug abuse, stress, psychoses) and
some environmental factors (pollution). The poor also have less access to quality medical
services so that they are more subject to medical mistakes in abortion and cannot afford to
buy fertilization services. Consequently, poor individuals are more affected by subfecundity
factors because they do not have access to the same technologies. Educated women who are
not naturally sterile remain childless for voluntary reasons.5 In line with the literature, we
assume that bearing and rearing a child takes time and this opportunity cost is higher for
more educated women.
With this framework, we explain the U-shaped relationship between childlessness and the
level of education. The relationship between these two variables is closer to a J-shaped for
married women because marriage works as a life-time instrument against extreme poverty.
Data from the National Survey of Family Growth for the years 1973 and 1976, which asked
women questions about procreation, corroborate that, unlikely to voluntary childlessness,
involuntary childlessness decreases with respect to education. Among childless women, the
proportion of voluntary childlessness increases with education from 10% for women with no
schooling to 70% for those with a Masters or Ph.D degree. The proportion of involuntary
childlessness decreases from 70% for the lowest education group to 20% for the highest one.
The proportion of women that we could not classify lies between 20 and 30 percent for all
education categories. Details are given in Appendix A.3.
The model economy of this paper is composed of men and women who play a two-stage game.
During the first stage, each individual is randomly matched with a partner of the opposite
3“Acquired sterility” means the failure to conceive after bearing a first child.
4The negative relationship between involuntary childlessness and income had already been documented
in Wolowyna (1977), for the 1971 Canadian Census data. Romaniuk (1980) provides a good discussion of
the existence of high levels of involuntary childlessness in very poor societies.
5With close arguments and from a cross-country analysis, Poston and Trent (1982) show the existence of
a U-shaped relationship between the development level of a country and the childlessness rate.
2
sex and decides whether to marry or not.6 In the second stage, couples and singles make
decisions about consumption and, if they can, fertility. A single man cannot have children
and consumes his life-cycle income. A single woman can either remain childless, by choice
or by destiny, or become a mother and face a trade-off between consumption and fertility.
When both the man and the woman decide to get married, they enter into a negotiation
process in which they determine (i) if they have children or not, (ii) how many and (iii)
how much each spouse will consume. Following a large literature initiated in the 1990s,
we assume a collective cooperative negotiation process. This process is a special case of
the general framework proposed by Chiappori (1988) and his co-authors (see Chiappori and
Donni (2009) for a literature review) to model households’ behaviors. As shown by Chiappori,
this framework has considerable empirical support. In line with Iyigun and Walsh (2007),
children are considered as a public good for the couple and there is no gender differences in
preferences. As in Echevarria and Merlo (1999), we also assume that the time cost of rearing
children is in part supported by men.
Becoming parents also entails a fixed time cost. This allows us to explain why single women
choose to be mothers less often than married women, and why, when they become mothers,
their fertility is almost as high as that of married mothers. Indeed, as single women cannot
rely on the time input of a partner, they are less prone to pay the fixed cost of becoming
a mother. However, when they do choose to pay it, they reduce the average time cost per
child by having more children.
Men will want to marry because it gives them the opportunity to have children and even-
tually to increase their consumption. As a counterpart, they will have to give part of their
time to childrearing. The advantage of marriage for women is that men alleviate the time
cost of raising children and might also increase their consumption. Marriage also generates
economies of scale since spouses share the expenses of household public goods. The hump
shaped relationship between marriage and education is related to the high childlessness rates
for extreme education levels; mainly because marrying a woman who cannot or do not want
to have children is less attractive for men.
To go beyond qualitative claims, we used the U.S. Census data for the year 1990 to identify
the deep parameters of the model and analyze its relevance. The model is able to reproduce
the three stylized facts enumerated at the beginning. It is well known that average fertility
decreases with the education of the mother, due to the higher opportunity cost of rearing
children for more educated women. However, we show that Malthusian mechanisms, where
6To simplify, we assume the match is done randomly and that there is no second round. Results with a
positive degree of assortative matching are given in Appendix C.5. We do not consider either couples of the
same sex or adoption, again for simplification purposes.
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education positively affects fertility, can appear for some part of the population. As this
positive effect touches few individuals in the U.S., we do not observe it on an aggregate level.
Concerning the U-shaped relationship between childlessness and education, we estimate that
5.0% of American women are socially sterile and 6.6% are voluntarily childless.
We also use the model to understand the changes that occurred over the period 1960-90
in marriage and fertility patterns. The model predicts that 50% of the change in marriage
rates and 30% of the decrease in childlessness rates are explained by the rise in education
levels. For the period 1990-2010, during which marriage rates stalled, rises in education
levels explain 40% of the drop, the rest being explained by mechanisms absent from our
model, such as the rise in divorce.
According to the notion of “capabilities” (Sen (1993)), fighting the causes of social sterility
would allow the set of capabilities of the poor to increase. We show that reducing wage
inequalities and promoting gender parity on the labor market are powerful tools to limit
the proportion of involuntary childlessness generated by poverty. A drop of 5% in the Gini
coefficient allows to reduce the percentage of socially sterile women by 20%.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper constitutes the first study of the determinants of
marriage and childlessness in a unified framework. Gobbi (2011) models the choice to remain
childless conditional on being married. She studies the determinants and the evolution of
voluntary childlessness during the twentieth century. Aaronson et al. (2011) focus on a
quantity-quality approach and look at how the Rosenwald Rural Schools Initiative in the
early twentieth century affected fertility along both the extensive and intensive margins
(childlessness versus the number of children if parent). They show that the expansion of
schooling opportunities decreased the price for child quality which decreased the proportion
of women with the highest fertility rates as well as childlessness rates, leading to more
families of smaller size. For younger cohorts, the increase in education lead to an increase in
the opportunity cost of time raising children increasing childlessness and reducing fertility.
We differ from these papers by looking at the role played by involuntary childlessness and
marriage opportunities.
A growing literature is concerned both with family composition and fertility choices. How-
ever, it does not allow the three facts to all be explained together. Greenwood et al. (2003)
and Regalia et al. (2011) analyze both marriage and fertility decisions in a dynamic program-
ming framework where individuals can divorce. Instead of increasing the complexity of their
set-up further to allow for different motives for childlessness, we develop a model abstracting
from divorce and concentrating on the mechanisms behind fertility decisions.7 Consequently,
7The models of Greenwood et al. (2003) and Regalia et al. (2011) allow for voluntary childlessness, but do
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our work complements preceding studies, while still replicating marriage rates in the United
States for women having completed their fertility life-cycle in 1990. Our way of modeling is
also different from theirs, due to our choice not to include divorce: we have a cooperative
decision process inside the household while Greenwood et al. (2003) use a Nash bargaining
framework and Regalia et al. (2011) use a unitary decision model where the woman chooses
the number of children that the couple has.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our stylized facts in details.
The theoretical model is described in Section 3 while Section 4 displays the identification
strategy for the parameters of the model and provides simulation results. Section 5 runs
counter-factual experiments to understand the changes that occurred between 1960 and
1990. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2 Three Facts from 1990 US Census
We use the 5% sample of the U.S. Census 1990 and restrict our attention to ever-married
and never-married women having completed their life-cycle fertility.8 We look at women
aged between 45 and 70 years old.9
Table 1 summarizes the three stylized facts we focus on in this paper. For each education
category, we report the completed fertility of mothers and childlessness rate. Standard errors
are given in Appendix A.5.
Fact 1: Single women are much more likely to be childless; however, when they chose to
become mothers, their fertility is lower by no more than one child compared to married
mothers for all categories of education.
The motherhood rate equals one minus the childlessness rate. As displayed in Table 1, there
is a large differential in motherhood rates between single and married women. Among singles,
the highest motherhood rate equals 47.6% for women with grade 11 while for married the
not look at involuntary childlessness. However Regalia et al. (2011) study how changes in relative earnings
affected the increase in the proportion of single mothers.
8The 1990 census is the last one for the U.S. to report completed fertility. We drop from our sample
women who are separated, divorced, widowed and married when their spouse is absent. The downwards
relationship between fertility of mothers and education and the U-shaped relationship between childlessness
and education hold for these women as well. These categories accounts for 30.5% of women. We exclude
them from the sample because we do not know since when they are no longer with their partner.
9The oldest and the youngest women of the sample have decided to marry and to become mothers in
somewhat different social and economic conditions. As shown in Appendix A.4, the facts presented in this
section also hold for each five-year cohort.
5
Education Childlessness Rates Completed Fertility of Mothers Marriage Rates
Category Married Single Married Single Women Men
1 0.088 0.755 4.880 3.897 0.699 0.705
2 0.075 0.590 4.791 3.810 0.836 0.851
3 0.078 0.631 3.916 3.480 0.909 0.895
4 0.072 0.560 3.647 3.419 0.933 0.910
5 0.066 0.588 3.519 3.324 0.945 0.914
6 0.059 0.524 3.485 3.430 0.948 0.920
7 0.076 0.781 3.079 2.549 0.948 0.922
8 0.083 0.839 2.961 2.125 0.942 0.931
9 0.077 0.825 2.976 2.257 0.945 0.932
10 0.101 0.934 2.788 1.944 0.916 0.92
11 0.137 0.959 2.606 1.911 0.840 0.917
12 0.191 0.957 2.408 1.743 0.755 0.912
all 0.081 0.787 3.160 2.935 0.930 0.930
Table 1: Facts from U.S. Census 1990
lowest rate of motherhood is 80.9% for PhDs. On average, 78.7% of single women remain
childless while 91.9% of married women become mothers.
Table 1 also shows that once single women decide to have children, they have almost the
same fertility as married mothers. Around grade 11, there is almost no difference between
the fertility of single and married mothers. The largest fertility differentials are observed
for extreme levels of education but remain below one child. We can finally observe that,
irrespective of marital status, fertility is negatively related to education. This negative
relation has already been stressed in many papers without conditioning on both marital
status and motherhood (see Becker (1991) pages 150-151, de la Croix and Doepke (2003)
and Jones and Tertilt (2008)).
Fact 2: Childlessness exhibits a U-shaped relationship with education for both single and
married women.
The relationship between childlessness and education is not monotonic unlike the relationship
between fertility and education. We explain this U-shaped relationship by the existence of
both involuntary and voluntary factors leading a woman to remain childless. For married
women, the U-shaped relationship looks more J-shaped because marriage is used as a way of
insuring against social sterility for women with the lowest levels of education. The increasing
side of the U-shaped relationship is easy to understand: highly educated women are more
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likely to be childless because their opportunity cost of raising children is high.
Fact 3: There is a hump-shaped relationship between marriage rates and education levels.
Marriage rates are very high for intermediate levels of education: from Grade 5 to Bachelor
degree, the marriage rate for women is above 90%. These rates are however much lower for
extreme levels of education. Less than 70% of women with no education and around 75% of
women with a PhD are married.
In Appendix A.6 we show Facts 1 and 2 for Whites, Blacks, Natives, Asians and Hispanics
separately. Our facts hold for each race with one exception: white married mothers have
between 1.5 and 2 times more children than singles. More details are given in Appendix A.6.
3 Theory
3.1 The Model
We consider an economy populated by heterogeneous adults, each being characterized by a
triplet: sex i = {m, f}, wage w, and non-labor income a. Marriage is a two stage game:
during the first stage, agents are matched randomly with an agent of the opposite sex. They
decide to marry or to remain single. A match will end up in a marriage only if the two
agents choose to marry. During the second stage of the game, agents decide how much to
consume and how many children to have, if any. The utility of an individual of sex i is
u
(
ci, n
)
= ln
(
ci
)
+ ln (n+ ν) , (1)
where ci is the individual’s consumption and n the number of children that he or she has,
and ν > 0 is a preference parameter. We chose to assume homogeneity in preferences,
both across and within genders. Above the obvious analytical simplification, this is a way to
measure by how much economic incentives account for our three stylized facts. Heterogenous
fertility, childlessness and marriage rates among education groups are generated only from
the structure of the marriage market and the heterogeneity with respect to labor and non-
labor incomes. Adding heterogenous preferences for children would be a way to fill the
remaining gap between the theoretical model and the stylized facts.
Each individual has a time endowment of 1 to be shared between working and child rearing.
We assume that single women can have children whereas single men cannot. Having children
entails time costs. First, there is a fixed cost, η ∈ (0, 1) to becoming a parent. This is justified
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by the fact that the first child costs more in terms of time than the following children.10 In
addition to the fixed cost, there is a variable cost: each child needs φ ∈]0, 1[ units of time
to be raised. If single, the mother has to bear the full time-cost alone. When married, the
husband bears a part (1− α) < 1/2 of the childrearing time.
For simplicity, we will abstract from natural sterility until Section 3.5. But it is essential to
model social sterility here, as it affects individual choices. We assume that in order to be
able to give birth, a woman has to consume at least cm:
cf < cm ⇒ n = 0 (2)
This assumption has been amply justified in the introduction by the fact that lower-income
groups are more exposed to causes of subfecundity than the rest of the population. Notice
that, unlike a good cost of children, cm does not depend on the number of children that the
mother will bear. A proportional good cost does not imply social sterility, as the mother
could choose a low enough number of children compatible with her budget constraint.
Each adult draws a non-labor income ai > 0 from a distribution F i (m¯ia, σia), independent
of his or her education. Non-labor income corresponds to domestic production and other
income uncorrelated with education. The total non-labor income for a couple equals af+am.
On the labor market, the wages of men and women are respectively denoted wf and wm.
Each household has to pay a good cost, µ, which is a public good within the household. This
type of cost is commonly assumed in the literature and gives some incentive to form couples
(see Greenwood et al. (2012)).
Given these assumptions, the budget constraints are as follows. For single men, consumption
cm equals income minus the household good cost µ:
cm = wm + am − µ
Single women can have children, their budget constraint is
cf + φ (1 + η(n))wfn = wf + af − µ (3)
10Turchi (1975) estimates that the mean number of hours spent per day on childrearing for a one-child
family is 1.4, for the first 18 years. For a two-child family it is 0.99 per child. And for a three-child family,
it is 0.93.
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where
η(n) =


η
n
if n > 0
0 if n = 0.
(4)
Given the time constraint φ(1+η/n)n ≤ 1 the maximum number of children a single woman
can have is n¯M =
1−φη
φ
. For couples, total non-labor income of the household net of cost is
a = am + af − µ. Their budget constraint is
cf + cm + φ (1 + η(n))
(
αwf + (1− α)wm)n = wm + wf + a (5)
The maximum fertility rate of a married woman equals nM =
1−αφη
αφ
. This is greater than
the maximum fertility of a single woman (nM > n¯M) because husbands help in the raising of
children. If spouses share the childrearing cost equally, the maximum number of children a
woman can have equals (2− φη)/φ.
To model couples’ decision making, we assume a cooperative collective decision model fol-
lowing Chiappori (1988).11 Spouses negotiate on cm, cf and n. Their objective function
is
U(cf , cm, n) = θ(wf , wm) u(cf , n) + (1− θ(wf , wm)) u(cm, n)
where θ(wf , wm) is the wife’s bargaining power that depends on education and is given by
θ(wf , wm) ≡ 1
2
θ + (1− θ) w
f
wf + wm
(6)
We specifically assume that the negotiation power of spouses is bounded, with a lower bound
equal to θ/2, and positively related to their relative wage. We use education as a proxy for
potential wages in our model so that negotiation power is in fact positively related to the
relative education of the spouse.12 The boundedness of the bargaining power function comes
from the legal aspect of marriage: spouses have to respect a minimal level of solidarity inside
marriage.
The different assumptions we have introduced imply some advantages to being married. It
11Due to the presence of the fixed cost µ, there is always a surplus coming from marriage. By adopting a
collective cooperative decision model, rather than a Nash bargaining process where potential spouses share
the marriage surplus, we avoid marriage rates being equal to one. With a Nash bargaining process, and no
frictions in the marriage market, everybody would get married in order to share the surplus. In this type of
framework, the only way to allow for some proportion of singles would be to assume some negative shocks
on the quality of the matching.
12See de la Croix and Vander Donckt (2010) for a discussion. An alternative consists in assuming a
negotiation power that depends on the spouses’ relative labor income rather than their relative education
as in Iyigun and Walsh (2007). We could also have included non labor income in the bargaining power, as
advised by Pollak (2005).
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allows the cost of the household µ to be shared. Being married is the only way for men to
have children. It allows women to reduce the opportunity cost of children (as long as α < 1).
Marriage gives at least one of the partners the opportunity to increase his/her consumption
compared to the situation where he or she remains single.
We impose the following assumptions on the parameters.
Assumption 1 The fixed cost η is not too large:
ν(1− cm) > η ,
−√η +√ν
φ
√
η(ν − η) > 1.
3.2 Possible “Regimes”
We solve the problem backwards, first considering the consumption and fertility choice con-
ditional on being married or not. Before studying (in Subsection 3.3) the precise conditions
on wages and non-labor income under which the various constraints bind, we list the different
possible “regimes”, each describing a living arrangement.
3.2.1 Single Women
A single woman maximizes (1) subject to (2), (3), (4) and 0 ≤ n ≤ n¯M. These women can
be in different regimes, depending on which constraint is binding.
Regime I. (Interior solution) If no other constraint than the budget constraint is bind-
ing and the corner solution with no children does not dominate, the interior regime prevails
with
cf
I
=
wf(1 + φ(ν − η)) + af − µ
2
nI =
1
2
[
wf(1 + φ(ν − η)) + af − µ
φwf
]
− ν. (7)
Equation (7) shows that the effect of woman’s education on fertility is ambiguous. A higher
wf implies the usual income effect which raises fertility. But the increase in wf also raises the
time cost to rear children, which reduces fertility through a substitution effect. If af > µ, the
substitution effect dominates and nI decreases with w
f , while the reverse is true if af < µ.
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Regime II. (Involuntary childlessness) If her income does not allow the consumption
level required to have children to be reached, the single woman lives in poverty and is
prevented from freely choosing the number of children that she has: cfII = w
f + af − µ < cm
and nII = 0.
Regime III. (Get fit to procreate) If her income is sufficiently high to escape Regime II
but not high enough to have as many children as in Regime I, it may be optimal for the
single woman to work and consume more in order to be able to procreate: cfIII = cm and
nIII =
wf(1− φη) + af − cm − µ
φwf
.
A necessary condition for this regime to prevail is af < cm+µ. Otherwise the woman would
be able to consume more than cm without working. a
f < cm + µ implies that nIII increases
with the wage wf . Regime III echoes Malthus’s fertility theory (see e.g. Galor (2005)).
Regime IV. (Voluntary childlessness) When being childless yields the highest utility,
the voluntary childlessness regime prevails: cfIV = w
f + af − µ and nIV = 0. This regime
will prevail when the opportunity cost of having children is high and the single woman fully
specializes in labor market activities.
Regime V. (Maximum fertility) When the opportunity cost of having children is low
and the non-labor income is high, it may be optimal for the woman to fully specialize in the
production of children: cfV = a
f − µ and nV = n¯M.
3.2.2 Couples
The problem for the couple is
max
cf ,cm,n
θ(wf , wm) ln cf + (1− θ(wf , wm)) ln cm + ln(ν + n)
subject to (2), (4), (5) and 0 ≤ n ≤ nM.13 Six living arrangements (regimes) are possible.
13An alternative would be to add two participation constraints: uf(married) ≥ uf (single) and
um(married) ≥ um(single). This implies that the partner with the highest negotiation power can have
an interest in reducing his/her welfare in order to incite his/her match to accept marriage. However, be-
cause rationality is common knowledge, such a marriage contract would not be credible: as couples cannot
divorce, the partner with the highest negotiation power has an incentive to deviate from the agreement.
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Regime VI. (Interior solution) If no constraint is binding and the corner solution with
no children does not dominate we have:
cm
VI
=
(
1− θ(wf , wm)) [wf (1 + φα(ν − η)) + wm (1 + φ(1− α)(ν − η)) + a]
2
cf
VI
=
θ(wf , wm)
[
wf (1 + φα(ν − η)) + wm (1 + φ(1− α)(ν − η)) + a]
2
> cm
nVI =
wf (1 + φα(ν − η)) + wm (1 + φ(1− α)(ν − η)) + a
2φ (αwf + (1− α)wm) − ν > 0.
An increase in the wage of the husband has an ambiguous effect on fertility:
∂nVI
∂wm
> 0⇔ wf > 1− α
2α− 1a.
In most of the literature (Galor and Weil (1996), etc.) α = 1, then an increase in the wage
of the husband has a pure income effect and ∂nVI/∂w
m > 0. When α < 1, the income effect
always dominates the substitution effect in families with very low non-labor incomes (a < 0).
In families with higher non-labor incomes (a > 0), the substitution effect dominates only
when the wage of the woman is low relative to the non-labor income of the couple.
In the case of an increase in the wife’s wage, we find:
∂nVI
∂wf
< 0⇔ wm > α
1− 2αa.
As long as α > 1/2, an increase in the woman’s wage always reduces fertility when a > 0.
In families with very low non-labor income (a < 0), the income effect dominates if the wage
of the husband is also very low.14
Finally, nVI does not depend on the negotiation power θ(w
f , wm) as there are no gender
differences in preferences for children.
Regime VII. (Involuntary childlessness) When total net income is too low to guar-
antee a sufficient consumption level to procreate: nVII = 0,
cm
VII
=
(
1− θ(wf , wm)) (wm + wf + a) and cf
VII
= θ(wf , wm)
(
wm + wf + a
)
< cm.
Regime VIII. (Eat and procreate) When the wife’s bargaining power is too low to
guarantee a sufficient consumption level allowing her to procreate in the interior regime, it
14Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) provide a discussion on the possible impacts of women’s wages on fertility.
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can be optimal for the husband to give up some consumption in order to have children. Then
cfVII = cm,
cm
VII
=
(
1− θ(wf , wm)) [wf (1 + φα(ν − η)) + wm (1 + φ(1− α)(ν − η)) + a− cm]
2− θ(wf , wm)
nVII =
1
2− θ(wf , wm)
[
wf (1 + φα(ν − η)) + wm (1 + φ(1− α)(ν − η)) + a− cm
φ (αwf + (1− α)wm)
]
− ν.
This is the only regime in which fertility depends on the wife’s bargaining power. This makes
fertility subject to three effects: the usual income and substitution effects and a negotiation
power effect. The latter arises because an increase in the wife’s education gives her more
bargaining power. As, in this regime, her consumption is fixed, the only way to obtain more
utility is through increased fertility. The net effect on fertility is the result of these three
forces.
Regime IX. (Voluntary childlessness) When choosing to be childless yields the highest
utility, we have: nIX = 0,
cm
IX
=
(
1− θ(wf , wm)) (wm + wf + a) and cf
IX
= θ(wf , wm)
(
wm + wf + a
)
.
In this case, the wage of the wife is so high that rearing children is too expensive. Both
spouses fully specialize in labor market activities.
Regime X. (Eat and procreate to the maximum) When it is optimal for the husband
to give up some consumption for his wife to specialize entirely in procreation: cfX = cm,
nX = nM and
cm
X
=
(
2α− 1
α
)
wm + a− cm.
Compared to Regime VIII, the optimal fertility rate of the couple does not depend on the
negotiation power of the wife. Indeed, as she has already reached her maximal fertility rate,
she is not able to give birth to an additional child to increase her utility.
This regime does not exist for single woman as it relies on the additional income provided
by the husband which allows uneducated mothers to specialize in the production of children
and still consume cm.
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Regime XI. (Maximum fertility) When the couple is sufficiently rich for the wife to
specialize in childrearing without requiring any sacrifice from the husband, nXI = nM,
cm
XI
=
(
1− θ(wf , wm))((2α− 1
α
)
wm + a
)
and cf
XI
= θ(wf , wm)
((
2α− 1
α
)
wm + a
)
.
3.3 Fertility and Consumption Choices
Conditional on a woman being single, we can determine optimal fertility and consumption
as a function of her wage and non-labor income.
In Appendix B.1, we define non-labor income thresholds, a and a, and wage thresholds,
Wf0 (af),Wf1 (af ), Wf2 (af ),Wf3 (af),Wf4 (af ) and Wf5 (af ). We also provide and prove a propo-
sition which allows us to describe the optimal behavior of a single woman endowed with
(wf , af). In Figure 1 and the following paragraphs we describe the main results of this
proposition.
When a < a, a single woman is childless no matter her wage. This is the case when her
non-labor income is too small. In this case, the wage allowing her to procreate is higher than
the wage for which she would choose to be voluntarily childless. This implies that once she
can afford a child, the time spent with him/her becomes too expensive.
In Figure 1, we represent the relationship between the fertility of a single woman and her
wage (education), when a > a. The left panel shows a non-monotonic relationship between
wage and fertility. The net non-labor income (af − µ) is still not high enough to cover the
minimal amount of consumption needed to procreate. For a low wf , Regime III (get fit to
procreate) prevails and an increase in the wage of the woman increases her fertility. As her
consumption is fixed at level cm in this regime, fertility is positively related to her wage until
it is high enough to reach the interior regime (I). In the interior regime, nI decreases with
wf because the substitution effect dominates (af ≥ a > µ).
In the right panel, non-labor income is high enough to ensure a consumption cm for any
fertility level, even in the absence of labor income. As a consequence, Regime III disappears,
and Regime V becomes possible. Regime V is a corner solution where the wage of the
woman is so small that it is optimal for her to specialize in childrearing and consume her
net non-labor income af − µ.
On the whole, Figure 1 shows that uneducated single women will either be involuntarily child-
less or in the maximum fertility case, this will depend on their non-labor income. Conversely,
highly educated women will be voluntarily childless (Regime IV) because the opportunity
14
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Figure 1: Fertility Conditional on Being Single when af ∈ [a, a[ and when af ≥ a
cost of having children (non-participation to the workforce) is high. This figure also shows
another important feature: the existence of a fixed cost of becoming a parent implies that
the passage from being childless to being a parent cannot be represented by a continuous
function. The fixed cost makes it never optimal to have a very low number of children.
We now turn our attention to couples. To simplify the computations, we expose the limit
case wm = 0, but all the results remain valid by continuity for small wm. In Appendix B.2,
we define non labor income thresholds A0, A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 as well as wage thresholds
WfA(a), WfA(a), WfA(a), WfA(a), WfA(a), WfB(a), WfC(a), WfC(a), W
f
D(a), WfE(a), WfF (a),
WfG(a) andWfH(a). In Appendix B.2, we provide and prove a proposition that describes the
optimal behavior of a couple endowed with (wf , a). In Figures 2, 3 and 4 and the following
paragraphs, we describe the main results of this proposition.
As for a single woman, for very low non-labor income (a < A0) and, by extension, low w
m,
a couple will be childless whatever the wife’s wage. The wage allowing the couple to have
children is higher than the wage for which they would choose to be voluntarily childless
(Regime IX).
For higher levels of non-labor income (a > A0), having children becomes feasible and optimal
for some wages. Figure 2 (left) shows that, when a ∈]A0, A1], a couple can have children
in the eat and procreate regime (Regime VIII) but the interior regime (Regime VI) is never
optimal. In Regime VIII, the husband voluntarily reduces his consumption in order to
enable his wife to have children. As shown in Figure 2 (right), Regime VI becomes optimal
for some wages and a > A1. In Figure 2 , the negotiation power effect dominates the income
and substitution effects in the eat and procreate regime. Then, an increase in wf increases
fertility in Regime VIII.
WfA corresponds to the wage allowing couples to procreate. For a wage greater than but close
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Figure 2: Fertility Conditional on Being Married when a ∈]A0, A1] and when a ∈]A1, A2]
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Figure 3: Fertility Conditional on Being Married when a ∈]A2, A3] and when a ∈]A3, A4]
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Figure 4: Fertility Conditional on Being Married when a ∈]A4, A5] and when a > A5
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to WfA, the consumption of the husband will be close to zero, implying that parenthood is
not optimal. This explains why Regime IX always precedes Regime VIII in Figure 2 and
Figure 3 (left).
In Figures 3 and 4, a > cm. Involuntary childlessness disappears as a couple can always
ensure that the wife can consume cm. It also implies that fertility decreases with women
wages in Regime VIII because the substitution effect dominates.
Regimes X and XI where the wife has the highest fertility appear in Figures 3 (right) and 4
for low wages. In Regime X, the wife consumes cm and entirely specializes in childrearing.
This regime becomes feasible once a > A2, but is optimal for some wages only when a ≥ A3
(when a < A3 the consumption of the husband is too low). Once w
f becomes sufficiently
high, the wife still consumes cm but spends a part of her time on labor market activities.
The additional income earned by the couple is allocated to the consumption of the husband.
Finally, Figure 4 (right) exhibits the same fertility pattern as Figure 1 for a single woman
and the same intuitions apply.
Poor couples will then be either childless (involuntarily or voluntarily) or in a regime where
the wife has the highest fertility. In all cases, couples in which the wife is highly educated
remain voluntarily childless.
3.4 Marriage Decisions
We now consider the decision to accept a marriage offer from a randomly drawn person
of the opposite sex. Once this potential partner has been drawn, we know the vector
(wf , af , wm, am). This allows each individual to compare his/her utility as a single and
as a married person and decide whether to accept marriage or not. In this section, we
provide some elements to highlight this choice.
Let us first consider the potential bride. From Propositions in Appendices B.1 and B.2 we
know the two relevant regimes she has to compare. When the potential bride has both a
low wage and a low non-labor income, she would live either in Regime II or Regime III if
she remains single. If the relevant regime for the woman when single is Regime II, then she
always prefers to be married with a husband allowing her to consume at least cmin, as
u(cf
II
, 0) < min{u(cm, nVIII), u(cfVII, nVII), u(cfIX, 0), u(cm, nM), u(cfXI, nM)}.
She would reject a marriage offer only in the case where the couple would be in Regime VII
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and if u(cfI , 0) > u(c
f
VII, 0), that is,
wf + af − µ > θ(wf , wm)(wm + wf + a).
The only motive for a very poor women to marry a men who does not provide enough to allow
her to procreate lies in the scale economies allowed by marriage: instead of paying a cost µ to
live as single people, they pay the same cost to live as a couple. Then, an uneducated women
will accept to marry an uneducated men because similar education ensures that negotiation
powers remain close to one half which allows the surplus from marriage to be shared equally.
If the relevant regime for a woman when single is Regime III, she always prefers to be a
single mother who consumes cm rather than a childless married woman who consumes less
than cm (i.e. u(cm, nIII) > u(c
f
VII, 0)). Hence, she would always reject marriage offers leading
to VII. Moreover, u(cm, nIII) < min{u(cm, nM), u(cfXI, nM)}, since in Regimes X and XI the
woman would consume at least cm and would have the maximum number of children. So
she would always accept marriage offers leading to X and XI.
For higher wf and af , Regimes I, IV or V are accessible as a single person. We can give some
details in two cases. First, Regime V (maximum fertility) is always preferred to Regime VII
and VIII: a poor woman (low wf) will always prefer to be single with the maximum number
of children rather than being an involuntary childless married woman or a married woman
who has to be fed in order to procreate. And second, Regime IV (voluntary childlessness)
does not dominate in only two circumstances: (a) when the additional income coming from
the man is not high enough to incite the woman to become a mother but sufficiently close to
her own income for the marriage surplus to be shared (Regime IX) and (b) when the man’s
wage is high enough to incite her to become a mother (Regime VI or XI).
We can then conclude that, unlike rich women, poor women will accept almost any match on
the marriage market. This highlights the role of marriage as an institution protecting women
against poverty, involuntary childlessness and even against living in a “get fit to procreate”
regime. Richer women do not need to be protected against involuntary childlessness by
marriage. On the contrary, for a rich woman, being matched with a rich man is the occasion
to have children rather than being a voluntarily childless single person because marriage
reduces the opportunity cost of motherhood.
As being single is not always a personal choice, let us now turn to the problem of the potential
husband. A single man has the following indirect utility,
u¯m = ln (wm + am − µ) + ln ν.
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Getting married is the only way for him to become a father but entails two costs: an oppor-
tunity cost due to the time spent with children and a potential decrease of his consumption.
This implies that a man will agree to marry without having children only if it increases his
own consumption, which arises when the potential bride is rich enough. Regimes VII and IX
can then dominate singleness for the man.
The opportunity to become a father is not always sufficient to incite the man to marry:
if having children decreases his consumption too sharply, he will remain single (singleness
would dominate Regimes VI, VIII, X and XI). This could apply to a man with a low income
who is matched with a woman who would be involuntarily childless as a single person: in
order to have children in the “eat and procreate” regime, he would have to give up too much
of his income and consume too little.
Once again, marriage is a protection against involuntary childlessness: two partners could
have children by pooling their income while they would have remained childless and single
otherwise. Men who live in Regime VIII agree to reduce their consumption in order to
enable their wives to have children. This is optimal if cm is not too large and the man not
too poor. Marriage can even prevent poor women becoming poor mothers. This is the case
when a rich man agrees to marry a poorly educated woman: despite her negotiation power
being minimal, she will consume more than cm because the consumption of rich men’s wives
increases linearly with wm.
Parameter α is important for marital decisions. For high values of α, the model predicts
higher marriage rates for rich men than for rich women as richer men have more reasons
to marry: they can have children at a low opportunity cost. For rich women the incentive
to marry is now low and marrying a poor man would only entail costs (they would remain
childless whatever the marital status). Poor women, on the contrary, will marry more often
as they are less often rejected by rich men who can have children without reducing their
consumption too much. For low values of α, the opportunity cost of becoming a father is
high and nothing ensures that rich men marry more often than rich women.
The model predicts a positive degree of assortativeness due to parameter θ. A higher θ
implies that spouses’ incomes are more equally shared. An individual with a much larger
income than his or her potential spouse will then be more likely to reject the offer as he/she
would have to give up too much of their own consumption.
To conclude, the model predicts lower marriage rates for extreme social classes. Women with
low levels of education are more likely to be involuntarily childless while highly educated
women will probably want to remain childless. This makes women from extreme social
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classes less attractive to men. Marriage could however occur when wages and non-labor
incomes are sufficiently close for them to share the marriage surplus.
3.5 Natural Sterility
So far we have abstracted from natural sterility. This amounts to assuming that involuntary
childlessness is only due to bad lifestyle and low income. In reality, there exists a positive
degree of sterility among men and women that is uncorrelated to lifestyle. We take this into
account here.
We assume that natural sterility is uniformly distributed over education categories. Let
χ ∈ [0, 1] and ζ ∈ [0, 1] respectively describe the percentage of female and male who are
naturally sterile. Eu(ci, n) denotes the expected utility of an agent of sex i and EU(cf , cm, n)
the expected utility of a couple. We have that Eu(cm, n) = um and:
Eu(cf , n) = χ · u(wf + af − µ, 0) + (1− χ) · u(cf , n)
EU(cf , cm, n) = (χ + (1− χ)ζ) · U(cf , cm, 0) + (1− χ− (1− χ)ζ) · U(cf , cm, n).
We explicitly assume that single women are not concerned with male sterility as they can
have multiple sexual partners.15 It implies that married women are more concerned with
sterility as they can be matched with a sterile partner. The marriage game now has three
stages: first, people enter the marriage market ignoring their sterility status and decide
whether or not to marry the partner they have been matched; second, they discover their
sterility status at no cost; and third, they decide how much to consume and, eventually, how
many children to have. As other assumptions have not changed, we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 When a single woman is naturally sterile, cf = af + wf − µ, and n = 0.
When a single woman is not naturally sterile, her optimal fertility choices are described by
Proposition 1. When a couple is not naturally sterile, spouses’ optimal decisions are described
by Proposition 2; while, when a couple is naturally sterile, spouses share the net income of
the household such that n = 0,
cm =
(
1− θ(wf , wm)) (wm + wf + a) and cf = θ(wf , wm) (wm + wf + a) .
15A woman who has n different sexual partners in her life meets only infertile partners with a probability
ζn. If natural sterility among males is 5% and a woman has only two different partners in her lifetime, she
has a probability of 0.0025 of meeting only infertile partners. According to the National Survey of Family
Growth (2002), the average number of lifetime sex partners for women who have always been single in the
U.S. is 7.44.
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Proof. As discovering sterility is made at no cost, choices of fecund single women and
fecund couples are the same as in the benchmark model. For those who discover that they
are naturally sterile, n = 0, implying that: (i) single women consume their net income and
(ii) couples share their net income as an involuntarily childless couple (Regime VII).
Compared to the benchmark model, we have added two categories of agents: sterile single
women and sterile couples. The possibility of being naturally sterile or being matched with
a naturally sterile partner has an impact on the incentive to marry. As couples face a higher
risk of being sterile than single women, natural sterility tends to reduce the overall marriage
rate compared to the benchmark model. In particular, the number of marriages between
highly educated men and poorly educated women should be strongly reduced. Indeed, the
only incentive for rich men to marry a poor woman lies in the possibility of becoming a
father. Now, when they marry a poor woman, they have to reduce their consumption and
to take the risk of remaining childless. Women with high education levels are less concerned
by this phenomenon as they can have children on their own.
4 Identification of Parameters and Simulations
The theory we developed in the previous section is very parsimonious. We have only seven
preference and technological parameters, to which we add two parameters for the distribution
of non-labor income. Despite this parsimony, we will match the three facts of Section 2.
However, once we compare our predictions to data for moments we do not try to replicate,
our model behaves well qualitatively but not quantitatively. From this perspective, adding
more features to the model, such as exogenous assortative matching and other dimensions
of inequality would help, but at the cost of tractability.
4.1 Identification
We identify the parameters of the model using the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM).
The nine parameters, listed in Table 2, are identified by minimizing the distance between 48
empirical and simulated moments. These moments are the completed fertility of mothers and
childlessness rates among both singles and married women, for the 12 education categories
listed in Table 5. The objective function to minimize is given by:
f(p) = [d− s(p)] [W ] [d− s(p)]′
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where p is the vector of model’s parameters, d denotes the vector of empirical moments and s
the vector of simulated moments, depending on the parameters. W is the optimal weighting
matrix, i.e. the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the empirical moments (Duffie
and Singleton (1993)). In our case, this simplifies into a diagonal matrix composed of the
inverse of the statistical standard errors of the empirical moments. Indeed, the covariances
across various education categories are zero, as these categories are independent (notice also
that they contain different numbers of observations). Moreover, the covariances between mo-
ments for married people and single people are also necessarily zero. Finally, the covariance
between childlessness rates and fertility is also zero as childlessness is nil for all individuals
for which n > 0. Intuitively, the use of the optimal weighting matrix implies that moments
with the lower standard errors will have a higher weight. Consequently, for these moments, a
higher distance between the data and the simulated moments will be more heavily penalized
in the objective function.
In order to construct the vector of simulated moments, we need some assumptions. First,
we assume that, for each category of education, the non-labor income of women follows a
log-normal distribution of mean κa and variance σ
2
a, from which we draw T observations.
Writing
κa = ln (m¯aw¯)− σ
2
a
2
where w¯ denotes women’s average wage, the parameter m¯a can be interpreted as the average
ratio of non-labor income to labor income.
Wages are exogenous and computed as follows:
we = γ exp{ρe} (8)
where e denotes the average number of years of education in each category (Table 5). We
assume that the gender wage gap γ is the same across education categories16 and equal to 0.9
(Erosa et al. (2010)) and we also assume that the Mincerian “rate of return to schooling” ρ
is equal to 0.1 (Krueger and Mikael (2001)). Normalizing wages with respect to the wage of
a woman who has a doctoral degree, the maximum wage among men equals 1.111 while the
minimum wage among women equals 0.135. The main drawback of the Mincerian approach
is to assume the same return to schooling for all schooling levels; its asset is to let income
depend on two parameters only, the gender wage gap γ and the return to schooling ρ, which
can be the subject of counterfactual experiments. Such counterfactual exercises are provided
16Assuming that γ increases with education, as some studies in the 1980s suggested, modifies the results
only marginally. Lips (2003) shows that this “education penalty” almost disappeared during the 1990’s.
22
in Subsections 5.3 and 5.4.
The two sterility parameters are fixed using information from the literature on natural steril-
ity. First we set the percentage of naturally sterile couples, χ + (1 − χ)ζ , at 3.7%. This
number is obtained from Leridon (2008) who uses the Henry database, which consists of data
for rural France from the 18th century, when fertility control was ineffective. Restricting the
sample to couples where the husband and wife were still living together at age 50, 3.7 % of
women who married at age 20-24 remained childless, which gives the rate of natural sterility
for couples. Second, our reading of the literature on the prevalence of fertility problems is
that roughly half of them with a diagnosed cause are related to the man, and half to the
woman.17 We therefore set χ equal to ζ . The two restrictions lead to χ = ζ = 1.87%.
To compute simulated moments, we proceed as follows. For each woman in each category
of education, we draw a potential husband from the empirical distribution of education
levels among men.18 For each level of men’s education, non-labor income is drawn from the
same distribution as women. Then, for each category of education for women, we obtain T
decisions about marriage and fertility and we are able to calculate the simulated moments.
The minimization of the objective function f(p) was first run using PIKAIA and the results
used as initial values in UOBYQA. PIKAIA is a genetic algorithm developed by Charbonneau
(2002), it allows global extrema to be found in highly non-linear optimization problems where
there exist a high number of local extrema. We used PIKAIA in a first step to identify
the region in the parameter space where the global maximum lies. Once this region has
been identified, we used a faster algorithm called UOBYQA (Powell (2002)) designed to
find a maximum of a well-behaved problem. It was developed for optimization when first
derivatives of the objective function were not available and takes account of the curvature
of the objective function, by forming quadratic models by interpolation. We ran these two
algorithms in FORTRAN 90. In the numerical implementation, we also assume that the
number of births is an integer rather than a continuous variable. This simplification does
not alter the main mechanisms at play but simplifies computational exercises (and is also
realistic).
17This estimation is quite imprecise as definitions of sterility and infertility used in the literature lack
uniformity (see Gurunath et al. (2011)).
18We rescaled the empirical marriage rate of men in order to have an equal number of men and women.
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Description Parameter Value Standard error
Variance of the log-normal distribution σa 0.312 0.0098
Average ratio of non-labor income to labor income m¯a 0.848 0.0109
Preference parameter ν 6.683 0.1090
Minimum consumption level to be able to procreate cm 0.311 0.0046
Good cost to be supported by a household µ 0.328 0.0066
Bargaining parameter θ 0.574 0.0082
Fraction of childrearing to be supported by women α 0.597 0.0041
Time cost of having children φ 0.224 0.0022
Fixed cost of children η 0.201 0.0081
Table 2: Identified Parameters, T = 100, 000
4.2 Results
The identified parameters are listed in Table 2. Appendix C.1 explains how the standard
errors are computed.19 Assumptions 1 and 2 hold under the values presented in Table 2.
Non-labor income amounts on average to 84.8% of labor income. This number seems quite
high, unless we interpret the non-labor income as including, in addition to home production,
bequests, capital income and transfers (including social security) that are not correlated with
the education level of the recipient. To have an idea of the magnitude of σa, we computed
a Gini coefficient on women’s simulated life-cycle income, wf + af , which came 0.166. The
estimated σa is relatively on the low side, but this is not surprising as some dimensions of
inequality are absent from the model, such as wage dispersion for similar education levels.
To interpret the value of cm and µ, remember that wages vary on a scale from 0.135 to 1 for
women. The wage of a woman having completed Grade 9 equals 0.333 so that women with a
degree lower than Grade 10 are not able to pay µ with their labor income. A single woman
with the lowest wage will need a non-labor income higher than 0.639 not to be involuntarily
childless.
Parameter θ = 0.574 means that the minimum negotiation power of a spouse is θ/2 = 0.287.
The childrearing time is shared between spouses. We estimate that men are involved for
40.3% of this time. The values for φ and η imply that the first child costs φ(1 + η) = 26.9%
of the time endowment of one parent, while the second child costs 22.4%. Following the
19For curiosity, we have identified the parameters under the assumption that they are race specific, and
that marriage markets are segmented by race. Results are in Appendix C.2. To be complete, we provide in
the same appendix the identification after having removed from the sample the “disables”. A discussion of
whether one should include them or not is provided in Appendix A.7.
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Figure 5: Childlessness Rate and Completed Fertility of Mothers, by Education Categories,
Married Women. Data (black) and Simulation (grey)
values of α, η and φ, the maximum number of children that a married woman can raise
is seven, while a single woman can have four children at most. This is coherent with the
literature on natural fertility such as Tietze (1957) for Hutterite women marrying at age 25,
Smith (1960) for the Coco Islands’ Malay women, or Henripin (1954) for the first generations
in Quebec.
The simulated moments that we obtain are represented in Figures 5 and 6. We fit data for
married women better because we have more observations for married than for single women
(1,055,171 observations representing 19,882,890 individuals for married women and 71,832
observations representing 1,498,555 individuals for single woman). This gives more weight
to married women in the objective function. We are able to reproduce that the difference
between the completed fertility of single and married mothers is no greater than one child
(Fact 1), and the U-shaped relationship between childlessness and education for both married
and single women (Fact 2).
As a test of the theory, we compare our results to three empirical observations that were
not used to identify the parameters. These are the marriage rates of men and women
and the fertility of husbands. Figure 7 shows that the model reproduces the hump-shaped
relationship between marriage rates and education levels (Fact 3). However, the model does
not replicate the percentage of marriages for the extreme categories of education among
men well. For highly educated men, the proportion of time they have to spend in rearing
children (around 40%) is too high, implying that having children and being married is too
costly for them. Setting α = 1 increases the marriage rates of highly educated men but the
marriage rates of highly educated women are now strongly underestimated as they lose their
incentive to marry and have children (we discuss this in more detail in Appendix C.3). We
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Figure 7: Marriage Rates of Women and Men, by Education Categories. Data (black) and
Simulation (grey)
can also reproduce the negative relationship between average fertility and the education of
husbands, although we underestimate its slope (see Appendix C.4). In contrast with the
marriage rates, in order to better fit husband’s fertility rates, we would need a lower value
of α (higher opportunity cost for men).
In order to analyze the role θ, we ran an estimation under the constraint θ = 1 (equal nego-
tiation power of spouses). The cost of marriage drastically increases for a highly educated
individual matched with someone with very low education: he/she will have to give up a large
part of his/her income to ensure equal consumption in the household. As a result, highly
educated will reject unions with lowly educated more often and the percentage of married
people in the extreme education categories decreases sharply. As heterogamous unions be-
come less valuable, marriage rates also decrease on average. Assuming an exogenous degree
of assortative matching, as in Appendix C.5, greatly helps to recover more realistic marriage
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rates. Finally, as poor women are less often married, they are also less protected against
involuntary childlessness when θ = 1 . Then the model tends to overestimate the percentage
of childlessness among lowly educated singles but the relationship between childlessness and
education decreases over a larger range of education categories (from one to six).
Table 3 provides the proportion of women in each regime.20 We see that uneducated single
women are either involuntarily childless (II) or have the maximum fertility (V), depending
on their non-labor income (as in Figure 1). Poor married women are either involuntarily
childless (VII), in the eat and procreate regime (VIII), or with the maximum number of
children (X and XI). This is consistent with Figures 2 to 4. Maximum fertility regimes,
where poorly educated women would like to have more children but are constrained by their
time endowment, concern 4.3% of American women (0.9% singles and 3.4% married). In
Regimes VIII and X, an increase in wages does not increase the consumption of the wife,
who consumes cm. It could however increase her fertility (in VIII). We estimate that 1.5%
of American women are this situation. This means that although aggregate fertility data
suggests that Malthusian checks no longer prevail and Becker’s model describes the negative
relationship between education and fertility well, our model detects that some categories of
the population are still affected by Malthusian mechanisms.
The largest fraction of the population is married with children (77.7% of American women).
It is this which allows us to replicate the downward-sloping relationship between fertility
and mother’s education. Women with the highest education are either voluntarily childless
(single in IV or married in IX), or married mothers in the interior regime VI. Regime IX
is the regime that we have in mind for DINKs while Regimes VI, VIII, X and XI are the
corresponding regimes for DEWKs.
Figure 8 plots the three causes of childlessness as a function of education. Considering all
education categories, non-natural involuntary childlessness (“social sterility”) concerns 5%
of American women (4.8% singles and 0.2% married), while voluntary childlessness concerns
6.6% of American women (3% singles and 3.6% married). We see that childlessness concerns
essentially either very poor (involuntarily childless) or very rich women (mostly voluntarily
childless), for both married and single people. This is in line with Figures 1 to 4. The
percentage of involuntarily childless women decreases with education, while the percent-
age of voluntarily childless women increases with education. This explains the U-shaped
relationship between education and childlessness (Fact 2).
20Note that Regime III (eat and procreate for single women) is not present in the simulations. This comes
from the discrete choice of fertility in the quantitative analysis which does not provide a consumption level
equal to cm.
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single married nat.
I II IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI steril.
1 0.0 13.0 0.0 6.0 14.3 6.1 39.6 0.0 2.2 15.5 3.3
2 0.2 9.2 0.0 4.9 32.3 4.1 31.2 0.0 0.4 14.2 3.4
3 1.2 5.9 0.0 2.7 67.0 1.2 8.6 0.9 0.0 9.0 3.5
4 1.6 5.6 0.2 1.7 77.9 0.3 1.1 1.8 0.0 6.2 3.4
5 1.7 5.6 0.5 1.3 79.9 0.1 0.2 2.3 0.0 5.0 3.4
6 1.8 5.5 0.8 1.0 80.9 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 3.9 3.4
7 1.8 5.4 1.4 0.7 81.1 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 3.0 3.3
8 1.7 5.1 2.4 0.5 81.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 2.2 3.3
9 1.5 4.2 4.2 0.3 80.4 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 1.6 3.2
10 1.1 1.4 10.2 0.2 77.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 0.0 0.7 2.9
11 0.9 0.3 14.0 0.1 74.1 0.0 0.0 7.4 0.0 0.4 2.7
12 0.4 0.0 29.3 0.0 58.9 0.0 0.0 9.2 0.0 0.1 2.0
all 1.6 4.8 3.0 0.9 77.7 0.2 1.5 3.6 0.0 3.4 3.3
Table 3: Marital and Fertility Regimes as a Function of Women’s Education in %
The hump shaped relationship between marriage and education is related to the high child-
lessness rates of uneducated and highly educated single women: marrying women who are
either not fit to procreate (or would require massive help from their husband to do so) or
have low incentives to have children (high opportunity cost) is less attractive.
Despite having assumed pure random matching in the marriage market, the model predicts
that individuals are more likely to marry someone with a similar level of education. This level
of assortativeness is lower in the simulations than in the data because of the static nature of
the model and the assumption that life only brings one chance to get married to a random
person. In Appendix C.5, we provide a way to measure the degree of assortativeness in the
data and the model. The model accounts for 24% of the variation in the assortativeness of
matching. In reality, the assortativeness is higher because, first, people meet several possible
matches (we would need a dynamic model to reproduce this), and second, individuals are
more likely to meet others who have similar levels of education to their own.
With a model able to match the level of assortative matching, in particular among poor
people, we expect a lower cm. In fact, 53% of women with no education marry a man
with no education. This is much higher than in our model. Consequently, our estimated
value of cm is probably too high because we have more women with no education marrying
men with higher levels of education than in reality. This means that in order to have
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Figure 8: Childlessness Causes, per Education Level (simulations)
involuntary childlessness, the constraint on cm must be higher. A way to increase the degree
of endogenous assortativeness consists in modifying the bargaining rule (6) by making it
less sensitive to the wage ratio. This will increase the rejection rate of matches with very
different people. However, achieving more assortativeness will be at the expense of matching
a reasonable marriage rate, as people only meet once in our static set-up. This is a limitation
of our approach.
A complementary and exogenous way to generate the right degree of assortativeness is to
assume, as in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2010), that a fraction λ of the female population
draws a possible match from her education category, while 1 − λ draws from the total
population. For each chosen value of λ, we can estimate the remaining parameters and see
whether changes are important.21 We provide the results in Appendix C.5, Table 16. Our
main results are robust to this change. For instance, when λ equals 0.3, the fit of the model
does not change significantly although the marriage matrix becomes much more satisfying.
Altogether, we can conclude that the benchmark model allows to understand the three facts
of the introduction for the year 1990.
21In Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2010), a fraction of the population is randomly matched, the rest being
matched following a Gale-Shapley algorithm, which generates perfect assortativeness.
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5 Counterfactual experiments
We have seen that the model characterizes well the relationship between childlessness and
fertility and the education of women, over a cross-section of individuals. Now, we use
these identified relationships in several counterfactual experiments. The first is a historical
experiment to understand the changes in marriage rates, childlessness and fertility over the
periods 1960-1990 and 1990-2010. Then, we also look at how an increase in inequality and
a change in the wage gap affect marriage rates, childlessness and fertility.
5.1 Rise in Education from 1960 to 1990
The number of people who completed Grade 12 (category 7) increased from 1960 to 1990
while those with an education lower than Grade 11 were fewer in 1990 than in 1960. This
implies an overall increase in the education level of both men and women.
5.1.1 Rise in Men’s Education
Let us first consider the effect of the rise in men’s education. Keeping the identified pa-
rameters constant, we simulate the moments using the proportions of men in each category
of education for the year 1960 and compare them with the simulated moments using the
proportions for 1990.22 We then compare the change in the simulated moments with the
change in actual data over the period 1960-1990.
The left panel of Figure 9 shows that the empirical marriage rates decreased for low skilled
and increased for high skilled women between 1960 and 1990. This qualitative change is well
accounted for by the model, as shown in the right panel of Figure 9. This implies that the
rise in men’s education explains the shift in the relationship between marriage and education
level well. Women with low education marry less often in 1990 because they are more often
turned down by more educated men while highly educated women are more likely to accept
an offer.
In 1960, completed fertility for single women was not given in the Census. We are thus limited
to analyzing changes in childlessness and fertility for married women only. In Figure 10,23
22The proportions of men and women in each education category in 1960, 1990 and 2010 are shown in
Appendix A.8.
23The relationship between childlessness and education in 1960 was not U-shaped. In Subsection 5.3 we
argue that a possible reason for this is increasing inequality.
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Figure 9: Marriage Rates, Data (left) and Simulation (right), 1960 (dots) and 1990 (solid)
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Figure 10: Childlessness Rates, Data (left) and Simulation (right), 1960 (dots) and 1990
(solid)
the left panel shows that the childlessness rates of married women decreased over this period
and the right panel shows that our model is partly able to explain this. Quantitatively, our
model accounts for a third of the drop. Women with low education marry richer men, which
allows them to escape the minimum consumption constraint.24
The fertility of married women increased over the period 1960-1990, for all education cate-
gories, as shown in the left panel of Figure 11. The rise in men’s education, on the contrary,
predicts a drop in fertility rates, due to higher opportunity cost of rearing children for more
educated men. The right panel of Figure 11 shows that this drop is very slight. The failure
to reproduce the rise in fertility is not surprising given that this period corresponds to the
exceptional event of the baby boom. Since childlessness rates decreased and the fertility of
mothers increased, total fertility increased during this period. The simulations are not able
24To generate a larger drop, a model where the fraction of childrearing supported by women α is covered
by baby sitters would be needed (see Hazan and Zoabi (2012)).
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to reproduce this, even though we can reproduce some of the decrease in childlessness.
In the theory, an increase in men’s education reduces both childlessness rates and the fertility
of mothers. The fact that these two variables move in the same direction shows that they
are affected by different mechanisms. Childlessness decreases because women marry richer
men and this decreases involuntary and voluntary childlessness. The fertility of mothers
decreases because fathers face a higher opportunity cost.
5.1.2 Rise in Women’s Education
To evaluate the effect of the rise in women’s education, we computed aggregate indicators
of fertility using the education shares of 1960 and 1990. Table 4 decomposes the change in
fertility into two parts: the share effect and the shift effect. The share effect captures the
impact of the increase in the education of women. It is given by the comparison between
the aggregate fertility in 1960 and the aggregate fertility in 1960 computed with women’s
education shares in 1990 (men’s education shares are fixed to those in 1960). Both data
and simulation indicate a drop of the same magnitude, related to the overall increase in
the education level of women, who have fewer children because their opportunity cost is
higher. The shift effect corresponds to the shift in the curve of Figure 11 (right) and is
obtained by comparing the aggregate fertility in 1990 with the fertility in 1960 if women’s
education shares had been those in 1990. This effect is positive in the data, but negative in
the simulation, as explained in the previous subsection.
We are not able to reproduce the increase in mothers’ completed fertility because some
women in the 1990 sub-sample are the mothers of the baby boom generations. Explaining
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1960 1960 (shares 1990) 1990 Shares Shift Total
(1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3)
Data 2.525 2.052 2.902 -0.472 0.850 0.378
Simulation 3.495 3.053 2.947 -0.442 -0.106 -0.548
Table 4: Decomposition of the Change in Aggregate Fertility
this goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, this historical experiment tells us that
without the baby boom, childlessness would have decreased by less and the completed fertility
of mothers would not have increased. The difference in the shift effect between simulation
and data constitutes a measure of the impact of the baby boom on aggregate fertility:
0.106 + 0.850 = 0.956 children per married woman.
5.2 Rise in Education from 1990 to 2010
From 1990 to 2010, education attainments have further increased (Appendix A.8). This
coincides with a significant decrease in marriage rates from 93% to 85.9%. In particular,
marriage rates decreased for all education categories except for PhDs, as shown in Figure 12
(left). In this subsection, we compute the impact of the variation in educational achievement
on the decrease in marriage rates.
Using the shares provided in Table 10 for the year 2010 and keeping the identified parameters
for 1990 fixed, we can compute the marriage rates predicted by the model. We then compare
the variation between the theoretical marriage rates to the data for the period 1990-2010.
As shown in the right panel of Figure 12, the model predicts a general decrease of marriage
rates for women (the pattern is similar for men) from 91.4% to 88.5%. This corresponds to
41.2% of the observed decrease in the marriage rates. Hence, changes in education explain
almost half of the dramatic change in marriage rates. The remaining part of the drop may
be explained by the demise of strict monogamy (see de la Croix and Mariani (2012)), which
reduces the number of “ever married” persons.
The model is also able to reproduce qualitatively the increase in the marriage rate for PhD
women. The main reason for this lies in the ex-post assortative matching that takes place.
As the proportion of men with a PhD increases, highly educated women have a higher chance
to be matched with a highly educated man and consequently, to agree to get married. We
remain short on this increase mainly because of the absence from the model of ex-ante
assortative matching on the marriage market.
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Figure 12: Marriage rates, women, data (left) and simulation (right), 1990 (dots) and 2010
(solid)
5.3 Increase in Inequality
Since 1980, income inequality and skill premia have been on the rise in the U.S. To assess its
effect on family patterns, we implement a rise in inequality through a change in the Mincer
parameter ρ of Equation (8). We increase the return of one additional year of education from
10% to 12%, keeping the wage of the largest category constant (Category 7); the change in
the Mincer parameter thus increases the spread around the wage of high school graduates.
To fix ideas, this corresponds to an increase in the Gini coefficient computed on wf + af
from 0.166 to 0.174.
From our theory, we anticipate that inequality increases both types of childlessness. As the
poor become poorer, the minimum consumption constraint binds more often and involuntary
childlessness rises. For the rich, the opportunity cost of having children is increased by
the higher skill premium (for both men and women), and more of them choose to remain
childless. We obtain that U-shaped pattern is clearly more pronounced for the higher Mincer
coefficient, and the effect on poorly educated women is particularly strong (see the figure in
Appendix C.6). On the whole, the number of women in involuntary childlessness regimes II
and VII increases by 20% (from 5% of the population to 5.9%). Going back to Figure 10,
where the U-shaped pattern emerged between 1960 and 1990, we can conclude that the rise
in wage inequality would be one of its driving forces.
The rise in inequality also affects the marriage rates of the highly educated. As women
in education categories 9 to 12 get richer, they become more demanding, and marry less
often. Hence, a rise in inequality is another candidate to explain the drop in marriage rates
observed from 1990 to 2010 (Section 5.2). Finally, the rise in inequality increases the slope of
the relation between the fertility of mothers and education as the opportunity cost of poorer
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Figure 13: Childlessness Rate for Different Wage Gaps - Single (left) and Married (right)
women decreases while it increases for the richer ones.
5.4 Changes in the Gender Wage Gap, γ
Another first order change of the last decades is the closing of the gender wage gap (Goldin
(1990) or Jones et al. (2003)). To assess its effect on family patterns, we simulate the model
for various values of the parameter γ of Equation (8), keeping the other parameters fixed.
Figure 13 shows the effect on childlessness for single (left) and for married (right) women. As
predicted by the proposition in Appendix B.1, there will be fewer poor women in the invol-
untary childlessness regime, but educated women are more likely to be voluntarily childless
(left panel). The same applies for married women. Closing the gender wage gap is therefore
a powerful tool to fight the involuntary component of childlessness.
A change in the wage gap has the usual properties on the aggregated fertility of mothers: a
decrease in the wage gap decreases fertility since it increases the opportunity cost of rearing
children. This is however not true for single women in the corner regime with maximum
fertility for whom fertility does not depend on wage: the effect of a higher relative wage is
not large enough for them to exit this regime. To get an idea of the magnitude of the effect
of wage wf on fertility, we compute the elasticity of total fertility to the wage gap for the
largest group (education category 7, married women). When the wage gap closes from 0.8
to 0.9, fertility drops from 3.40 to 3.22, which gives an elasticity of -0.05.
The wage gap also has an effect on marriage rates. Poor women will marry more often, while
highly educated women will marry less often. This effect is particularly large for Ph.Ds: if
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the wage gap goes from 0.8 to 1, their marriage rate drops from 0.779 to 0.624.
6 Conclusion
To analyze fertility behavior we distinguished explicitly the decision to have children from
the choice of the number of children. This distinction turned out to be important, both in
terms of data and theory.
Data shows the following three facts. First, single women are much more likely to be childless
but, when mothers, their fertility is lower by no more than one child than that of married
mothers. Second, childlessness exhibits a U-shaped relationship with education for both
single and married women. Third, there is a hump-shaped relationship between marriage
rates and education levels. These facts are robust for different races and age cohorts.
We have developed a model that allows us to analyze the effect of men’s and women’s incomes
on fertility going beyond the usual distinction between income and substitution effects. Both
non-labor income and wages play a complex role, shaping the incentives to agree to marry
or not, and affecting the allocation of resources in the couple.
The main conclusion from the theory is to identify several “regimes” and the conditions
under which these regimes will prevail. Some of these regimes are new compared to the
literature, and turn out to be quantitatively important. Involuntary childlessness can have
natural or social causes. Social involuntary childlessness regimes appear for women with low
education and low non-labor income, either single or married; we estimate that they account
for 5% of American women. In the “eat and procreate” regime, the income of the woman is
not high enough for her to be fit to procreate, but it is optimal for her husband to abandon
part of his consumption in order to be able to produce children within the couple. This
should be highlighted: although aggregate fertility data suggests that Malthusian checks do
not prevail any more and Becker’s model describes the relationship between education and
fertility well, our model detects that some categories of the population are still affected by
Malthusian mechanisms. In the voluntary childlessness regime, highly educated women do
not have children because of their high opportunity cost.
Our theory also provides a framework to interpret childlessness for both single and married
women, allowing for involuntary childlessness for uneducated women and voluntary child-
lessness for highly educated ones. Simulations show that those regimes are not “empty”, and
concern a significant fraction of the population. The relatively high percentage of the popu-
lation in these regimes allows us to understand the U-shaped relationship between education
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and childlessness highlighted in the stylized facts. Still, the majority of the population is
married, in the interior regimes, which allows us to replicate the usual downward sloping
relation between fertility and mother’s education.
Marriage interacts with childlessness in two ways; for poor women, marriage is an opportunity
to get enough resources to be able to have children. Hence, marriage reduces involuntary
childlessness. For rich women, marriage reduces the opportunity cost of having children, as
husbands also help with raising the children; it therefore also reduces voluntary childlessness.
Identifying the structural parameters of the model using a simulated method of moments
technique shows that the features of the data on fertility and childlessness are well captured.
On the whole, our model provides a way of understanding the relationship between fertility
and education, childlessness and education, and finally, marriage and education all taken
together.
Using the model to understand the changes that occurred over the period 1960-1990 we have
learned that an increase in the education of men leads to a decrease in both involuntary
and voluntary childlessness and an increase in the marriage rate of educated people. As
the model fits the relationship between mother’s education and fertility very well, it also
accounts well for the effect of the increase in the average education of women on fertility.
Involuntary childlessness is of particular relevance as far as social welfare is concerned, as it
restricts the capabilities of individuals. We have shown that closing the gender wage gap is
a powerful tool for limiting the proportion of involuntary childlessness generated by poverty.
A more detailed study in the allocation of time between men and women could give further
insights and predictions for changes in today’s fertility trends. Allowing for a more complex
marriage market structure would also improve the predictions of the model in terms of
assortative matching.
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A Data - For Online Publication
A.1 Education Categories
We divide the population into 12 categories of education and report the average number of
years of education, e, for each category as well as the number of observations (sum of singles
and ever-married) per category. Each of these observations has a weight given by the Census
and represents between 2 and 186 individuals.
Nb Category e N. obs. Nb Category e N. obs.
1 No school 0 12,122 7 Grade 12 12 479,703
2 Grade 1-4 3 14,050 8 1 year of college 13 178,274
3 Grade 5-8 7 84,243 9 2 years of college 14 53,428
4 Grade 9 9 38,121 10 Bachelor degree 16 99,046
5 Grade 10 10 57,213 11 Master degree 17 56,855
6 Grade 11 11 49,413 12 Doctoral degree 20 4,612
1 to 12 1,127,080
Table 5: Education Categories.
A.2 Cohabitation and Uneducated Single Mothers
When dealing with never-married individuals we might be skeptical about whether these
individuals are single or just unmarried with a partner (specially poor women who have
many children). In the Census 1990, among never-married women aged 45-70, only 1.8%
declared themselves as being with a partner. The percentages for mothers and childless
were respectively 3.7% and 1.3%. The percentages vary, however, for different education
levels: Table 6 provides the proportion of single mothers, aged 45-70, saying they are with
an unmarried partner for each education level.
This table confirms that very few women who have not married are living with a partner.
The highest percentages of cohabitation are seen for women aged 36-40, having achieved
Grade 1-4, or with a doctoral degree: respectively 21.5% and 21.7% of never-married women
in these education levels claim to be unmarried but have a partner.
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Bramlett and Mosher (2002) estimate that, in 1995, 42.7% of never married women between
ages 40-44 had ever cohabited. Their definition for cohabitation was being unmarried but
having a sexual relationship while sharing the same usual address. They also say that the
probability of transition to marriage after 1 year of cohabitation is 30%, after 5 years, 70%,
and after 10 years, 84%. Consequently, if cohabitation lasts, marriage is very likely to follow.
Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel (1990) compared cohabitants to both married and single in-
dividuals and concluded that cohabitants’ attitudes were in many respects closer to those
of single than of married people. In particular, cohabitants’ fertility expectations are more
similar to those of single than married people. Indeed, comparing the percentage of child-
less individuals who expect children, cohabitants are much closer to never-married than to
married respondents (among women, 11% of cohabiting, 4% of single and 40% of married
people expect to have a child within two years). Consequently, although cohabitation has
many of the characteristics of a marriage (sharing a dwelling unit), cohabitants also share
some of the characteristics of single people (fertility expectations). This puts cohabitants in
a middle position between single and married people.
A second question raised by our facts concerns the identity of those uneducated mothers
who have many children. Table 7 gives some information. The column (1 − φn)wf + af
reports the total income of the person. Earnings are in column (1−φn)wf . Not surprisingly,
earnings decrease with the number of children, probably because hours worked drop as the
number of children rises. More interestingly, the column af reports the difference between
total income and earnings. We observe that fertility increases with af , which is a prediction
of our model. Now, who are these women? Very few of them report to be with an unmarried
partner (see Table 6). Less than half of them are black. A majority head of their household.
Category % Category %
1 3.8 7 3.6
2 4.8 8 2.8
3 4.0 9 3.8
4 3.6 10 3.0
5 3.8 11 2.8
6 4.0 12 8.2
Table 6: Percentage of Single Mothers, Aged 45-70, with an Unmarried Partner
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n nobs. (1− φn)wf + af (1− φn)wf af % with % black % head of
partner household
1 17,531 7,302.87 5,014.92 2,287.95 6.7% 33.5% 35.0%
2 11,797 7,889.39 5,817.37 2,072.03 9.5% 39.1% 45.3%
3 7,108 6,923.74 4,553.75 2,369.99 11.1% 39.4% 52.5%
4 4,636 6,712.25 3,998.48 2,713.77 6.4% 32.1% 56.8%
5 2,882 6,239.59 3,556.02 2,683.57 5.0% 41.8% 61.1%
6+ 5,446 5,844.52 2,576.98 3,267.54 6.1% 36.4% 64.5%
Table 7: Single Mothers with no Education
A.3 NSFG surveys
The National Survey of Family Growth asks women between 15 and 44 years of age questions
about their fecundity status and fertility intentions. This allows us to classify each respon-
dent as either voluntarily or involuntarily childless. Looking at the NSFG for the years 1973
and 1976, we have examined in detail 306 childless women between 36 and 44 years old.
These women belong to the cohort considered for our stylized facts in Section 2.
We denote a woman as voluntarily childless if: (1) she was voluntarily sterilized for con-
traceptive reasons, (2) she has always used contraception, (3) she has been pregnant and
aborted, (4) she does not intend to have children but does not report any difficulty in becom-
ing pregnant, or (5) she does not intend to have children but does not report any difficulty
conceiving or delivering a baby for her or her husband.
We denote a woman as involuntarily childless if she would like to have children and one of
the following conditions is met: (1) she has not been using birth controls for at least two
years but has become pregnant, (2) she has never used contraception and has been married
for a long period, (3) she reports either a difficulty or the impossibility of having a baby, or
(4) she has problems or difficulties to conceiving or delivering a baby for her or her husband
(some women had had up to six miscarriages).
We assume that a woman wants a child if she says that (1) she wants to become pregnant as
soon as possible, (2) she would like a baby when pregnancy is dangerous or impossible, (3)
she plans to adopt if she cannot have a child of her own, (4) she has adopted and does not use
contraception because she does not mind getting pregnant, (5) she wanted children before
marriage and never used contraception, or (6) she talked with her doctor about increasing
her chances of having a baby.
We did not know how to classify some women, either because information was missing or the
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Figure 14: Involuntary and Voluntary Childlessness (in %), by Education Category
information was contradictory. Here are some representative examples of these women: (1)
she has never used contraception but says that she decided not to have children and has no
problem becoming pregnant, (2) she used contraception, reports being able to procreate and
is seeking pregnancy or intends to have a child in the next two years (she could become a
mother soon), or (3) she or her husband remained sterile not for contraceptive reasons (but,
for example, through accident or illness), but were still young enough to procreate.
Figure 14 shows the relationship between involuntary and voluntary childlessness and the
level of education. Notice that the U-shaped relationship between childlessness and education
also holds in this dataset.
A.4 Five-year cohorts
The stylized facts highlighted in Section 2 can also be found if we consider each 5-years cohort
separately. Figures 15 and 16 show the relationship between childlessness and education and
the fertility of mothers and education for married and single women for each cohort. The
only major difference between cohorts is in the childlessness rate of single women, with
intermediate levels of education (Figure 16): older single women were much less likely to be
mothers than younger single women.
44
➡➢
➤➢
➥➡➢
➥➤➢
➦➡➢
➦➤➢
➧➡➢
➥ ➦ ➧ ➨ ➤ ➩ ➫ ➭ ➯ ➥➡ ➥➥ ➥➦
➨➤➲➤➡
➤➥➲➤➤
➤➩➲➩➡
➩➥➲➩➤
➩➩➲➫➡
➳
➵
➸
➺
➻
➼
➳ ➵ ➸ ➺ ➻ ➼ ➽ ➾ ➚ ➳➪ ➳➳ ➳➵
➺➻➶➻➪
➻➳➶➻➻
➻➼➶➼➪
➼➳➶➼➻
➼➼➶➽➪
Figure 15: Childlessness Rate and Completed Fertility of Mothers, by Education Category,
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Figure 16: Childlessness Rate and Completed Fertility of Mothers, by Education Category,
Single Women
A.5 Standard errors of the mean
Table 8 reports the standard errors of the mean for the completed fertility and the childless-
ness rates of both single and married mothers.
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Education Childlessness Rates (×10−3) Completed fertility of Mothers
Category Married Single Married (×10−3) Single (×10−2)
1 0.70 1.61 7.49 2.205
2 0.55 2.35 6.30 2.154
3 0.23 1.29 2.06 1.158
4 0.32 2.27 2.62 1.676
5 0.25 2.03 1.98 1.569
6 0.25 2.29 2.09 1.626
7 0.09 0.60 0.57 0.621
8 0.15 0.83 0.86 0.938
9 0.27 1.60 1.55 1.615
10 0.23 0.62 1.07 1.556
11 0.35 0.47 1.41 2.201
12 1.47 1.34 5.08 4.875
Table 8: Standard Errors from U.S. Census 1990
A.6 Races
In this appendix, we split the population into five racial groups, Whites, Blacks, Natives,
Asians and Hispanics. We constructed each race group from two variables: RACE and
HISPAN. In order for an individual to be considered as White, Black, Native or Asian, he or
she has to be from that particular race and “not Hispanic”. We do not know the race of 435
observations so the sum of the races is not equal to the sum of the observations. Table 9 gives
the number of observations (unweighted) by education category for each race. Figures 17
and 18 show the childlessness rate and completed fertility of mothers, by education category,
for married women and single women respectively.
For all groups, we find a negative relationship between the fertility of married mothers and
education. For single mothers, we have few observations for Asians and Natives so the re-
lationship is not as clear. For other single mothers, the relationship holds for Blacks and
Hispanics and is slightly hump-shaped for Whites. The fertility differential between single
and married mothers is larger for white women than for others: married mothers have be-
tween 1.5 and 2 times more children than single mothers. Hispanic married mothers have
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Blacks Whites Natives Asians Hispanics
1 1,264 4,631 274 1,518 4,400
2 1,673 5,276 200 868 6,002
3 8,897 59,603 806 2,397 12,487
4 4,029 29,879 300 832 3,059
5 5,468 47,968 471 680 2,598
6 5,877 40,798 361 338 2,018
7 24,421 429,963 1,985 8,115 15,078
8 8,787 160,406 937 ,2988 5,104
9 2,631 46,909 275 1,758 1,838
10 4,092 88,089 262 4,551 2,025
11 3,641 49,819 164 1,941 1,283
12 242 3,974 16 207 172
Total 71,022 967,315 6,051 26,193 56,064
Table 9: Number of Observations by Education Category and by Race
no more than one child more than single mothers for all education categories. For Blacks,
the difference between the fertility of married and single mothers decreases as education
increases. Both the U-shaped relationship between childlessness and education and the
hump-shaped relationship between marriage rates and education hold in general. In partic-
ular for Asian married women, childlessness always increases with education; childlessness
of single Hispanic women is flat for the first education levels and then increases. Comparing
across groups, we see that Black women are in general more likely to be childless if married,
less likely to be childless if single and that the U-shaped relationship (Fact 2) is more pro-
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Figure 18: Childlessness Rate and Completed Fertility of Mothers, by Education Category,
Single Women
nounced for them than for other groups. Both single and married Black mothers have more
children than White mothers. Differential fertility between groups decreases with education.
A.7 Disability
The U-shaped relationship between childlessness and education is highly affected when we
consider the data without individuals who have any lasting physical or mental health condi-
tion that prevents or causes difficulty working, living independently or taking care of their
own personal needs (respectively, variables DISABWRK, DIFFMOB and DIFFCARE of
IPUMS). Note that these variables say nothing about the ability to reproduce. For married
women the relationship between childlessness and education is not affected, but the rela-
tionship for single women becomes flat for the first education levels and only increases from
Grade 11 on.
Our position is that disabled women are, de facto, lowly educated and the constraint cf > cm
reflects their incapacity to have children when they do not have a husband investing in them.
Moreover, in 1990 the Census did not distinguish birth defects from disabilities acquired later
in life.25 Poor working conditions for the lowly educated is likely to affect their health aged
45-70. There is then a clear endogenous problem in the relationship between disability and
education: adults who lived in the worst conditions (the ones with the lowest education)
are the most likely to suffer health problems when older. In other words, the poor are more
likely to have health problems when old than the rich. Consequently, we argue in favor of
keeping the disabled in the dataset.
25See http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/sipp/disab02/ds02t2.html for information about dis-
ability types and their proportions in the U.S.
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A.8 Education Shares
Education level 1960 1990 2010
men women men women men women
1 0.024 0.019 0.012 0.011 0.015 0.014
2 0.085 0.057 0.018 0.013 0.009 0.009
3 0.427 0.393 0.094 0.072 0.036 0.031
4 0.064 0.068 0.036 0.033 0.016 0.013
5 0.070 0.078 0.047 0.050 0.022 0.019
6 0.046 0.048 0.035 0.043 0.023 0.020
7 0.149 0.203 0.316 0.422 0.287 0.309
8 0.027 0.033 0.168 0.161 0.159 0.159
9 0.032 0.040 0.042 0.048 0.080 0.099
10 0.040 0.039 0.125 0.090 0.206 0.201
11 & 12 0.036 0.021 0.107 0.057
11 0.089 0.052 0.127 0.117
12 0.018 0.005 0.023 0.011
Note: Education categories 11 and 12 were merged in the 1960 Census. Data for 2010 is
taken from the American Community Survey (ACS).
Table 10: Proportions of Individuals in Each Education Category
B Theory
B.1 Optimal Decisions of Single Women
In this appendix, we first provide a definition of non-labor income and wage thresholds useful
to establish a complete description of the choices made by single women in function of their
wage and their non-labor income. We then provide Proposition 2 and prove it.
Definition 1 (Non-labor income thresholds for singles)
a = cm
(
φ(ν + η)− 1
φν
)
+ µ , a = cm + µ > a
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Definition 2 (Wage thresholds for singles)
Wf0 (af ) =
cm + µ− af
1− φη , W
f
2 (a
f ) =
2cm + µ− af
1 + φ(ν − η) ,
Wf3 (af ) =
af − µ
1 + φ(ν − η) , W
f
5 (a
f) =
af − µ
φ(ν + η)− 1 ,
Wf1 (af) is the smallest root of the quadratic equation in wf :
(
wf + af − µ) ν = cm
(
wf(1− φη) + af − µ− cm
φwf
+ ν
)
, (9)
Wf4 (af) is the smallest root of the quadratic equation in wf :
ln
(
wf + af − µ) ν = 2 ln wf(1 + φ(ν − η)) + af − µ
2
− ln (φwf) .
Proposition 2 (Fertility of singles) Under Assumption 1, the optimal choice of a single
woman with non-labor income af and wage wf is given by:
1. when af < a:
• ∀wf <Wf0 (af), cf = cfII, n = 0,
• ∀wf ≥ Wf0 (af ), cf = cfIV, n = 0.
2. when af ∈ [a, a[:
• ∀wf <Wf0 (af), cf = cfII, n = 0,
• ∀wf ∈ [Wf0 (af ),Wf1 (af)[, cf = cfIV, n = 0,
• ∀wf ∈ [Wf1 (af ),Wf2 (af)[, cf = cm, n = nIII,
• ∀wf ∈ [Wf2 (af ),Wf4 (af)[, cf = cfI , n = nI,
• ∀wf ≥ Wf4 (af ), cf = cfIV, n = 0.
3. when af ≥ a:
• ∀wf <Wf3 (af), cf = cfV, n = n¯M,
• ∀wf ∈ [Wf3 (af ),Wf4 (af)[, cf = cfI , n = nI,
• ∀wf ≥ Wf4 (af ), cf = cfIV, n = 0.
Proof. To prove Proposition 2, we need to show that under Assumption 1:
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1. when af < a, Wf5 (af) < Wf2 (af ) < Wf0 (af ) and Wf0 (af) is greater than the highest
root of Equation (9);
2. when af ∈ [a, a[, Wf0 (af) <Wf1 (af ) <Wf2 (af ) <Wf4 (af) <Wf5 (af );
3. when af ≥ a, Wf3 (af) <Wf4 (af ) <Wf5 (af ).
Proof and Implications of 1.
Straightforward computations indicate that when af < a, Wf5 (af ) < Wf2 (af) < Wf0 (af ).
When wf ≤ Wf0 (af), becoming a mother is not feasible either in the interior regime or in
the get fit and procreate one.
Once wf > Wf0 (af ), a single woman can have children in Regime III. Comparing utility in
Regime IV with utility in Regime III, u(cfIV, 0) ≤ u(cm, nIII) if and only if,
(
wf + af − µ) ν ≤ cm
(
wf(1− φη) + af − µ− cm
φwf
+ ν
)
. (10)
The LHS is linear and increasing in wf and the RHS is increasing and concave in wf (since
af − µ < cm), so Equation (10) holding with equality (i.e. Equation (9)) has at most two
solutions. At Wf0 (af ), the LHS of Equation (10) is higher than the RHS, implying that
u(cfIV, 0) > u(cm, nIII). This implies that Wf0 (af ) is either smaller than the lowest root of
Equation (9) or greater than its highest root. Under Assumption 1, atWf2 (af), u(cm, nIII) ≥
u(cfIV, 0) when a < a, meaning that Wf2 (af) is in between the roots of Equation (9). As
Wf0 (af) >Wf2 (af), Wf0 (af) is above the highest root of Equation (9).
This means if af < a, women are either involuntarily childless or voluntarily childless: once
women become able to procreate (wf >Wf0 (af )), becoming a mother is not optimal as the
opportunity cost of children is too high.
Proof and Implications of 2.
• First, we show that, for af ∈ [a, a[, Wf0 (af) <Wf1 (af ) <Wf2 (af).
Considering Equation (10), when wf =Wf2 (af ), we have
LHS(Wf2 (af )) =
2cm + (a
f − µ)φ(ν − η)
1 + φ(ν − η) ν
RHS(Wf2 (af)) =
cm
2cm − (af − µ)
1 + φ(ν − η)
φ
.
51
When af ∈ [a, a[, RHS(Wf2 (af )) > LHS(Wf2 (af )) is satisfied under Assumption 1.
This ensures that Wf2 (af) is in between the two roots that solve Equation (9). As
Wf1 (af), defined in Definition 2, is the smallest root of that equation, Wf1 (af ) <
Wf2 (af).
Wf0 (af) < Wf2 (af) when af > a and the Inequality (10) is not satisfied for Wf0 (af ),
then Wf0 (af ) <Wf1 (af) <Wf2 (af ).
Then, we can conclude that, under Assumption 1, ∀wf ∈ [Wf0 (af),Wf1 (af)[, u(cfIV, 0) >
u(cm, nIII) and that ∀wf ∈ [Wf1 (af ),Wf2 (af )[, u(cm, nIII) ≥ u(cfIV, 0).
• Second, we show that Wf2 (af ) <Wf4 (af) <Wf5 (af) when a ∈ [a, a].
The value ofWf2 (af), as defined in Definition 2, solves nIII = nI. AtWf2 (af ), u(cm, nIII) =
u(cfI , nI) and Regime I can be reached. This means that, ∀wf > Wf2 (af), u(cfI , nI) >
u(cm, nIII) . At Wf2 (af), u(cm, nIII) ≥ u(cfIV, 0). So, we can conclude that u(cfI , nI) ≥
u(cfIV, 0) at Wf2 (af ).
Regime I exists for wf ∈ [Wf2 (af),Wf5 (af)[ where the value of Wf5 (af) as defined
in Definition 2 solves nI = 0. For all w
f > Wf5 (af ), u(cfI , nI) is not defined since
∂nI/∂w
f < 0, so that nI would be negative. Then, for w
f > Wf5 (af), Regime IV
prevails if single. Let us compare utility in Regime IV with utility in Regime I when
wf ≤ Wf5 (af ). u(cfIV, 0) ≥ u(cfI , nI) if and only if,
ln
wf + af − µ
wf(1 + φ(ν − η)) + af − µ + ln ν ≥ ln
wf(1 + φ(ν − η)) + af − µ
φwf
− 2 ln 2. (11)
Considering Equation (11), at wf = 0, the LHS is equal to ln ν and the RHS goes to
+∞. At +∞, the limits of the LHS and the RHS are, respectively,
ln
1
1 + φ(ν − η) + ln ν
and
ln
1 + φ(ν − η)
φ
− 2 ln 2
so that the RHS is above the LHS for low values of wf . For large values of wf , we
cannot rank the two limits, and the RHS can be above or below the LHS. As both sides
of the inequality are strictly decreasing and convex with wf , the LHS can be equal to
the RHS for either one or two values of wf .
At wf = Wf5 (af), the LHS is larger than the RHS (LHS - RHS = ln(1 + η/ν)),
implying that u(cfIV, 0) > u(c
f
I , nI). This implies that Wf5 (af ) is either in between
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the roots of Equation (11) holding at equality or at the right of the only root. Since
u(cfI , nI) is not defined for w
f ≥ Wf5 (af ), the relevant root Wf4 (af ) of LHS=RHS
is therefore for a value of wf lower than Wf5 (af ) and we have Wf4 (af ) < Wf5 (af ).
This proves that u(cfIV, 0) < u(c
f
I , nI) for w
f < Wf4 (af), and that u(cfIV, 0) ≥ u(cfI , nI)
for wf ∈ [Wf4 (af ),Wf5 ](af ). Intuitively, because there is a fixed cost to becoming a
parent, the optimal fertility is not continuous in wf . At the point Wf4 (af), utility with
a positive fertility is equal to utility with zero fertility.
We showed that ∀wf < Wf4 (af ), u(cfI , nI) > u(cfIV, 0) and that at Wf2 (af ), Regime I
exists and u(cfI , nI) > u(c
f
IV, 0). This implies that Wf2 (af ) <Wf4 (af ).
Until now, we have proved that Wf0 (af ) < Wf1 (af ) < Wf2 (af) < Wf4 (af ) < Wf5 (af)
under Assumption 1 .
Regime V is not reachable when af < a since the consumption in Regime V is equal
to af − µ, which does not allow the woman to reach the minimal consumption level
allowing her to procreate.
Summarizing these partial results, we can conclude that:
– ∀wf <Wf0 (af), cf = cfII, n = 0,
– ∀wf ∈ [Wf0 (af ),Wf1 (af)[, u(cfIV, 0) > u(cm, nIII) and cf = cfIV, n = 0,
– ∀wf ∈ [Wf1 (af ),Wf2 (af)[, u(cm, nIII) ≥ u(cfIV, 0) and cf = cm, n = nIII,
– ∀wf ∈ [Wf2 (af ),Wf4 (af)[, u(cfI , nI) > u(cfIV, 0) and cf = cfI , n = nI,
– ∀wf ∈ [Wf4 (af ),Wf5 (af)], u(cfIV, 0) ≥ u(cfI , nI) and cf = cfIV, n = nIV
– ∀wf ≥ Wf5 (af ), cf = cfV, n = 0.
Proof and Implications of 3.
We are now in the case af ≥ a, where Regime V is accessible for all wf ≥ 0. Furthermore,
Regimes II and III no longer exist since even with a wage equal to zero, a woman can
consume more than cm allowing her to procreate. We then just need to compare the utilities
in Regimes I, IV and V.
From Equation (7), nI > n¯M ⇐⇒ wf < Wf3 (af ), with Wf3 (af ) defined in Definition 2
solving nI = n¯M. For all w
f < Wf3 (af), u(cfI , nI) is not defined as nI would be above the
maximum possible (more time in life would be needed).
Let us now show that Wf3 (af) < Wf4 (af ) < Wf5 (af ). We know from Inequation (11) that
both the LHS and the RHS are strictly decreasing and convex in wf . We can check that
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at Wf3 (af) the LHS is lower than the RHS. It follows from the definitions of Wf3 (af ) and
Wf5 (af) (Definition 2) that Wf3 (af) < Wf5 (af ). Since at Wf4 (af ) the LHS is equal to the
RHS, then Wf3 (af) <Wf4 (af) <Wf5 (af ).
At Wf3 (af ) we can show that u(cfV, n¯M) = u(cfI , nI) > u(cfIV, 0). As u(cfI , nI) is increasing
in wf and u(cfV, n¯M) is unaffected by w
f , we have that u(cfI , nI) ≥ u(cfV, n¯M) for wf ∈
[Wf3 (af ),Wf5 (af )]. As u(cfIV, 0) is increasing in wf and u(cfV, n¯M) is unaffected by wf , we also
have that u(cfV, n¯M) > u(c
f
IV, 0) ∀wf <Wf3 (af).
Given that Wf3 (af) <Wf4 (af ) <Wf5 (af ), we can conclude that:
• when wf ≤ Wf4 (af ), cf = cV and n = n¯M,
• when wf ∈ [Wf4 (af),Wf5 (af)], u(cfIV, 0) ≥ u(cfI , nI) > u(cfV, n¯M), which implies that
cf = cfI and n = nI,
• when wf >Wf5 (af), u(cfIV, 0) > u(cfV, n¯M) and cf = cfV while n = 0.
B.2 Optimal Decisions of Couples
As for single women, we provide some wage thresholds as well as non-labor income thresholds
that are useful to describe the optimal decisions of couples which will be described in the
following appendix. We also determine Assumption 2 under which our results will be valid.
We then state Proposition 3, where we describe the optimal decisions of a couple as a function
of its labor and non-labor incomes, and prove it.
Definition 3 (Wage thresholds for couples)
WfA(a) =
cm − a
1− αφη , W
f
B(a) =
cm − a
1− αφ(η + νθ
2
)
,
WfD(a) =
2cm − a
(
1− 1
2
θ
)(
1− 1
2
θ
)
(1 + αφ(ν − η)) , W
f
E(a) =
a− cm
1
2
θ (1 + αφ(ν − η)) ,
WfF (a) =
a
1 + αφ(ν − η) , W
f
I (a) ≡
1− φαη
φαν
a,
WfC(a) is such that U(cmVIII, cfVIII, nVII)− U(cmIX, cfIX, 0) is maximal.
WfG(a) is such that U(cmX , cm, nM) = U(cmIX, cfIX, 0).
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WfH(a) is the highest root of the equation U(cmVI, cfVI, nVI) = U(cmIX, cfIX, 0).
WfC(a) and WfC(a) satisfy U(cmVIII, c
f
VIII, nVIII) = U(c
m
IX
, cfIX, 0).
Note: WfA(a) is such that the couple can afford positive fertility (n → 0, cf = cm and
cm = 0). WfB(a) is such that nVIII = 0. WfD(a) is such that nVIII = nVI. WfE(a) is such that
nVIII = nM. WfF (a) is such that nVI = nM. WfI (a) is such that U(cmXI, cfXI, nM) = U(cmIX, cfIX, 0).
WfC(a) is the value of wf that maximizes U(cmVII, cfVII, nVII)− U(cmIX, cfIX, 0):
WfC(a) =
−[a(1 + αφ(ν − η))1
2
θ + 2(cm − a)]
2
(
1
2
θ − 1) (1 + αφ(ν − η))
−
√
[a(1 + αφ(ν − η))1
2
θ − 2(a− cm)]2 + 4a(a− cm)
(
1
2
θ − 1) (1 + αφ(ν − η))
2
(
1
2
θ − 1) (1 + αφ(ν − η)) .
WfC(a) and WfC(a) are respectively the lowest and the highest roots of
ln
(
αφνwf(wf + a)
)
=
(
1− 1
2
θ
)
ln
cm
1− 1
2
θ
+
(
1 +
1
2
θ
)
ln
wf(1 + αφ(ν − η)) + a− cm
1 + 1
2
θ
.
WfG(a) is such that U(cmX , cm, nM) = U(cmIX, cfIX, 0):
WfG(a) =
(
cm
1− 1
2
θ
)1− 1
2
θ (
a− cm
1
2
θ
) 1
2
θ
1 + αφ(ν − η)
αφν
− a.
WfH(a) is the highest root of the equation U(cmVI, cfVI, nVI) = U(cmIX, cfIX, 0):
WfH(a) =
αφ(ν + η)− 1 +√(αφ(ν + η)− 1)2 + (4αφν − (1 + αφ(ν − η)))2)
a
,
Definition 4 (Non-labor income thresholds for couples)
A0 is the value of a that solves U(c
m
VII
, cfVII, nVII) = U(c
m
IX
, cfIX, 0) where w
f =WfC(a).
A1 is the value of a that solves U(c
m
VII
, cfVII, nVII) = U(c
m
IX
, cfIX, 0) where w
f =WfD(a).
A2 = cm,
A3 is the lowest value of a such that WfG(a) = 0,
A4 is the value of a such that WfG(a) =WfI (a),
A5 =
cm
1− 1
2
θ
.
The following assumption is a technical assumption on the parameters (see Appendix B.2
for details).
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Assumption 2 Parameters α, ν, η, θ, and cm satisfy that:
when wf =WfC(a), U(cm, cmVIII, nVIII)− U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) increases with a, ∀a < A4;
WfG(A5) >WfE(A5) and (∂WfG(a) −WfE(a))/∂a > 0 ∀a ≤ A5.
Details for Assumption 2:
∀a < A4 : φαν
[
∂WfC(a)
∂a
(2WfC(a) + a) +WfC(a)
]
<
(
cm
1− 1
2
θ
)1− 1
2
θ
1 + φα(ν − η)
(1 + 1
2
θ)
1
2
θ
(
(1 + φα(ν − η))WfC(a) + a− cm
) 1
2
θ ∂WfC(a)
∂a
,
implies that wf =WfC(a), U(cm, cmVIII, nVIII)− U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) is increasing in a, ∀a < A4.
(1− 1
2
θ)1−
1
2
θ (1 + φα(ν − η))2
φαν
> max
{
1 + φα(ν − η)
1− 1
2
θ
;
[
1 + (1− 1
2
θ)(1 + φα(ν − η))
]
c
1
2
θ
m
}
.
implies that WfG(A5) >WfE(A5) and (∂WfG(a) −WfE(a))/∂a > 0 ∀a ≤ A5.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 2, the optimal choice of a couple with non-labor income
a and wages wf is given by:
1. When a ≤ A0:
• if wf <WfA(a), cf = cfVII, cm = cmVII, n = 0
• if wf ≥ WfA(a), cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
2. When a ∈]A0, A1]:
• if wf <WfA(a), cf = cfVII, cm = cmVII, n = 0
• if wf ∈]WfA(a),WfC(a)], cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
• if wf ∈]WfC(a),WfC(a)], cf = c
f
VIII, c
m = cm
VIII
, n = nVIII
• if wf ≥ Wf
C
(a), cf = cfIX, c
m = cm
IX
, n = 0
3. When a ∈]A1, A2]:
• if wf <WfA(a), cf = cfVII, cm = cmVII, n = 0
• if wf ∈]WfA(a),WfC(a)], cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
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• if wf ∈]WfC(a),WfD(a)], cf = cfVIII, cm = cmVIII, n = nVIII
• if wf ∈]WfD(a),WfH(a)[, cf = cfVI, cm = cmVI, n = nVI
• if wf ≥ WfH(a), cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
4. When a ∈]A2, A3]:
• if wf ≤ WfC(a), cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
• if wf ∈]WfC(a),WfD(a)[, cf = cfVIII, cm = cmVIII, n = nVIII
• if wf ∈]WfD(a),WfH(a)[, cf = cfVI, cm = cmVI, n = nVI
• if wf ≥ WfH(a), cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
5. When a ∈]A3, A4]:
• if wf ≤ WfG(a), cf = cfX, cm = cmX , n = nM
• if wf ∈]WfG(a),max{WfE(a),WfC(a)}[, cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
• if wf ∈] max{WfE(a),WfC(a)},WfD(a)[, cf = cfVIII, cm = cmVIII, n = nVIII
• if wf ∈]WfD(a),WfH(a)[, cf = cfVI, cm = cmVI, n = nVI
• if wf ≥ WfH(a), cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
6. When a ∈]A4, A5]:
• if wf ≤ WfE(a), cf = cfX, cm = cmX , n = nM
• if wf ∈]WfE(a),WfD(a)[, cf = cfVIII, cm = cmVIII, n = nVIII
• if wf ∈]WfD(a),WfH(a)[, cf = cfVI, cm = cmVI, n = nVI
• if wf ≥ WfH(a), cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
7. When a > A5:
• if wf ≤ WfF (a), cf = cfXI, cm = cmXI, n = nM
• if wf ∈]WfF (a),WfH(a)[, cf = cfVI, cm = cmVI, n = nVI
• if wf ≥ WfH(a), cf = cfIX, cm = cmIX, n = 0
Proof. We use a two-step strategy. First, we highlight some general properties of the model.
Second, we prove each part of the proposition.
Step 1: Some General Properties of the Model
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• Regimes VII and IX are ”continuous”
∀wf > 0, U(cfVII, cmVII, 0) = U(cfIX, cmIX, 0). A couple is able to have children once its total
income is greater than cm which is satisfied when w
f > WfA(a). This implies that
∀wf <WfA(a), childlessness is involuntary, while it is voluntary above this threshold.
• Regimes VIII and VI are ”continuous”
Regime VIII exists once nVIII ≥ 0 which is satisfied ∀wf ≥ WfB(a), while Regime VI
exists once cfVI ≥ cm which is satisfied ∀wf ≥ WfD(a). We can verify that when
wf =WfD(a), cfVI = cm and nVI = nVIII, it induces U(cm, cmVIII, nVIII) = U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI) for
wf =WfD(a). It also implies that Regime VIII is defined for all wf ∈ [WfB(a),WfD(a)]
while Regime VI is defined ∀wf ≥ WfD(a) (limwf→∞ nVI > 0).
• Equation U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI) = U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) always admits two positive roots when it is
solved with respect to wf in R.
U(cfVI, c
m
VI
, nVI) = U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0)
⇔ [4ναφwf(wf + a)] 12 = wf(1 + αφ(ν − η)) + a. (12)
Let us denote by LHS(wf) the left-hand side of Equation (12) and by RHS(wf) its
right-hand side. We have that LHS(0) = 0 while RHS(0) = a > 0. Furthermore,
RHS(wf) is increasing and linear while LHS(wf) is increasing and concave:
∂LHS(wf)
∂wf
= 2φαν(2wf + a)(wf [wf + a])−
1
2 > 0
∂2LHS(wf)
∂wf2
= −φαν[wf (wf + a)]− 32a2 < 0.
Because of the respective curvatures of LHS and RHS and because LHS(0) <
RHS(0), Equation (12) admits at most two positive roots. These solutions can be
found by solving the quadratic equation:
[4φαν − (1 + φα(ν − η))2]wf2 + 2awf [φα(ν + η)− 1]− a2 = 0.
As the discriminant of this equation equals R ≡ 16νη(φαa)2 > 0, Equation (12) admits
two real roots that we denote respectively WfH and WfH :
WfH =
1− φα(ν + η) + 2aαφ√ην
4φαν − (1 + φα(ν − η))2 , W
f
H
=
1− φα(ν + η)− 2aαφ√ην
4φαν − (1 + φα(ν − η))2 .
58
Necessarily, (WfH ,WfH) > (0, 0). As φα(ν + η)− 1 > 0, (4φαν − (1 + φα(ν − η))2) has
to be negative to ensure thatWf
H
> 0. We can then deduce thatWf
H
>WfH > 0. Both
Wf
H
and WfH are linearly increasing with a and WfH =WfH = 0 when a = 0.
• When af ≤ A0, U(cfVII, cmVII, 0) and U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) are always higher than U(cm, cmVIII, nVIII),
and also than U(cfVI, c
m
VI
, nVI) for w
f =WfD(a).
U(cm, c
m
VIII
, nVIII) and U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0) are both increasing in a.
U(cm, c
m
VIII
, nVIII)− U(cmIX, cfIX, 0) is positive when,
(
αφνwf(wf + a)
) 1
1+ 1
2
θ >
(
cm
1− 1
2
θ
) 1− 12 θ
1+ 1
2
θ wf(1 + αφ(ν − η)) + a− cm
1 + 1
2
θ
. (13)
Since the left-hand-side is strictly increasing and concave with respect to wf and
the right-hand-side is linearly increasing with wf , we know that U(cm, c
m
VIII
, nVIII) −
U(cfIX, c
m
IX
, 0) admits a unique maximum that we denote WC(a). Furthermore, we can
check that Inequality (13) is not satisfied when wf = 0 and a < cm.
Under Assumption 2, when wf =WfC(a), U(cm, cmVIII, nVIII)− U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) is increasing
in a for a < A4. This means that the maximum value of U(cm, c
m
VIII
, nVIII)−U(cfIX, cmIX, 0)
increases monotonically with a. It implies that there is a value, a = A0, where A0 solves
U(cm, c
m
VIII
, nVIII) = U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0) when wf =WfC(a):
(
1 +
1
2
θ
)
ln
cm
1 + 1
2
θ
−
(
1− 1
2
θ
)
ln
(
1− 1
2
θ
)
+
(
1 +
1
2
θ
)
ln
(
WfC(1 + αφ(ν − η)) + A0 − cm
)
− ln
(
αφνWfC
(
WfC + A0
))
= 0.
This means that when af ≤ A0, U(cfVII, cmVII, 0) = U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) > U(cm, cmVIII, nVIII).
As wf = WfD(a) implies that U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI) = U(cfVIII, cmVIII, nVIII), we also find that
U(cfVI, c
m
VI
, nVI) < U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, nIX) for w
f =WfD(a) and a ≤ A0.
• U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI) < U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) for all wf >WfD(a) when a ≤ A1
The equation U(cfVI, c
m
VI
, nVI)− U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) is quadratic with respect to wf . It admits
a unique maximum for wf =WfJ (a),
WfJ (a) ≡
αφ(ν + η)− 1
4αφν − (1 + αφ(ν − η))2a <W
f
D(a).
Then U(cfVI, c
m
VI
, nVI)− U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) is decreasing for all wf > WfD(a). Since ∀a ≤ A1,
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U(cfIX, c
m
IX
, 0) > U(cfVIII, c
m
VIII
, nVIII) = U(c
f
VI, c
m
VI
, nVI) for w
f =WfD(a), then U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI)
< U(cfIX, c
m
IX
, 0) for all wf >WfD(a) when a ≤ A1.
• Regime X is never preferred to Regime IX for a < A3
WfG(a), as defined in Definition 3, is the unique root of U(cfX, cm, nM)−U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) = 0.
As WfG(a) < 0 for a < A3, Regime X will never be preferred to Regime IX for a < A3.
• There exists a unique A4 > 0 such that ∀a ∈ [A3, A4], WfG(a) < WfE(a) while ∀a ∈
[A4, A5], WfG(a) >WfE(a)
Here, we compute the values of WfG(a) and WfE(a) when a is equal either to A2 = cm
or A5:
WfG(cm) = −cm < 0 , WfG(A5) =
1
1− 1
2
θ
cm
[
(1− 1
2
θ)
1
2
θ 1 + φα(ν − η)
φαν
− 1
]
> 0
WfE(cm) = 0 , WfE(A5) =
cm
1 + φα(ν − η) .
Under Assumption 2,WfG(A5) >WfE(A5) and ∂W
f
G
(a)−Wf
E
(a)
∂a
> 0 ∀a ≤ A5. This implies
that there exists a unique A4 > 0 such that ∀a ∈ [A3, A4], WfG(a) < WfE(a) while
∀a ∈ [A4, A5], WfG(a) >WfE(a)
Step 2: Proof of Each Part of the Proposition
Step 2.1: Cases where a < A2 = cm
Regimes X and XI are not reachable because cm
X
< 0 and cfXI < cm for a
f < cm. So we only
have to compare the utilities UVII(a, w
f), UVIII(a, w
f), UVI(a, w
f) and UIX(a, w
f) to see the
outcome of a marriage.
Case 1: a < A0
Here, we will show that, as in the first case of Proposition 1, once agents with low non-labor
income are able to be parents, the opportunity cost of childrearing is too high for them to
be willing to.
The value WfA defined in Definition 3 solves the following equation:
cm + αφηw
f = wf + a.
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A0 < cm soWfA > 0. For wf <WfA, the consumption of a woman who wants to have children
will be lower than cm even if her husband does not consume. Consequently, for w
f < WfA,
the couple is involuntarily childless. For wf ≥ WfA, the couple can have children, and has to
decide between parenthood and childlessness.
As a < A0, U(c
f
VIII, c
m
VIII
, nVIII) is lower than U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0), ∀wf . By continuity we know that
U(cfVI, c
m
VI
, nVI) is lower than U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0) for wf =WfD(a). By definition ofWfH(a), we know
that U(cfVI, c
m
VI
, nVI) < U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0) ∀wf >WfH(a). As WfD(a) >WfH(a), ∀wf ≥ WfA, couples
are voluntarily childless.
We can then conclude that for wf <WfA(a), cf = cfVII, cm = cmVII, n = 0 while, if wf ≥ WfA(a),
cf = cfIX, c
m = cm
IX
, n = 0.
Case 2: a ∈ [A0, A1[
In this case, we will show that Malthusian mechanisms can be at play for some poor couples.
When a = A1 and w
f = WfD, U(cfVIII, cmVIII, nVIII) = U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI) = U(cfIX, cmIX, 0). We also
know that for wf =WfD, U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI)− U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) is negative when a < A1.
As A1 < cm, WfA > 0 and couples are involuntarily childless when wf <WfA. Furthermore:
lim
wf→W
f
A
U(cf
VIII
, cm
VIII
, nVIII) = −∞.
This is because for wf → WfA, cmVIII → 0. U(cfVIII, cmVIII, nVIII) is then lower than U(cfIX, cmIX, 0)
in the neighborhood of WfA.
As a > A0, U(c
f
VIII, c
m
VIII
, nVIII)− U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) admits two positive roots, denoted WfC(a) and
Wf
C
(a), and is positive between them. As a ≤ A1, when wf = WfD(a), U(cfVIII, cmVIII, nVIII)
= U(cfVI, c
m
VI
, nVI) < U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0). This means that once the interior regime can be reached
by the couple, having children is not optimal.
Since WfD(a) > WfH(a), U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI) − U(cfIX, cmIX, 0) is decreasing ∀wf > WfD(a). This
implies that U(cfVI, c
m
VI
, nVI) is always smaller than U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0), ∀wf > WfD(a). It also
implies that although having children in the interior regime is possible for the couple, this
will never be an optimal choice.
We conclude that for a ∈]A0, A1], couples are in Regime VII for wf <WfA(a), in Regime IX
for wf ∈]WfA(a),WfC(a)], in Regime VIII for wf ∈]WfC(a),WfC(a)] and in Regime IX again
for wf >Wf
C
(a).
Case 3: a ∈]A1, A2]
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In this case, we can show that for intermediary values of non-labor incomes, a couple can
either be in a Malthusian or a modern fertility pattern. This will crucially depend on the
wage of the wife.
As a ≤ A2 ≡ cm, WfA(a) ≥ 0 and couples are involuntarily childless for wf < WfA. Us-
ing the same reasoning as for the previous case, lim
wf→W
f
A
U(cfVIII, c
m
VIII
, nVIII) = −∞, and
U(cfVIII, c
m
VIII
, nVIII) < U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0) in the neighborhood of WfA.
Since a > A1, U(c
f
VI, c
m
VI
, nVI) is higher than U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, 0) for wf =WfD(a).
Since U(cfVIII, c
m
VIII
, nVIII) = U(c
f
VI, c
m
VI
, nVI) for w
f =WfD(a), we know thatWfD(a) lies between
WfC(a) and WfC(a). Furthermore, as U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, nIX)−U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI) = 0 admits two positive
roots, WfH and WfH , W
f
D(a) also lies between these two roots.
We conclude that for a ∈]A1, A2], couples are in Regime VII when wf <WfA(a), in Regime IX
when wf ∈]WfA(a),WfC(a)], in Regime VIII when wf ∈]WfC(a),WfD(a)], in Regime VI when
wf ∈]WfD(a),WfH(a)] and in Regime IX again when wf >WfH(a).
Step 2.2: Cases where a ≥ A2 = cm
For a > cm, Regime VII no longer exists: a couple can procreate for any w
f ≥ 0. Regimes X
and XI become reachable. Note that as long as wf <WfD(a), only Regimes IX, VIII and X
can be reached.
Case 4: a ∈]A2, A3[
NowWfG(a) < 0. As long as wf <WfD(a), only Regimes IX, VIII and X can be reached. We
now have to compare Regimes VIII and IX for wf <WfD(a). As a > A0, U(cfVIII, cmVIII, nVIII) >
U(cfIX, c
m
IX
, 0) for wf ∈ [WfC ,WfC ]. This implies that Regime IX prevails ∀ wf ∈ [0,W
f
C [.
As shown above, if a > A1, then WfD(a) ∈ [min{WfC ,WfH},max{WfC ,W
f
H
}]. This implies
that Regime VIII prevails ∀wf ∈ [WfC ,WfD[ while Regime VI prevails ∀wf ∈ [WfD,WfH [.
Finally, Regime IX prevails when wf ≥ Wf
H
.
Case 5: a ∈]A3, A4[
In line with previous cases and Step 1, under Assumption 2, we know that, for a ∈]A3, A4[
WfG < max{WfC(a),WfE(a)} < WfD(a) < WfH(a). We can conclude that Regime X pre-
vails when wf <WfG(a) while Regime IX prevails when wf ∈]WfG(a),max{WfC(a),WfE(a)}[.
When wf ∈ [max{WfC(a),WfE(a)},WfD(a)[, Regime VIII is chosen by the couple while
Regime VI is preferred to others when wf ∈ [WfD(a),WfH(a)]. Finally, for wf > W
f
H
(a),
Regime IX prevails again.
Case 6: a ∈]A4, A5[
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The only difference between Case 6 and Case 5 lies in the fact that for a ∈ [A4, A5[, WfG >
WfE(a). Therefore, we have that WfE < WfC(a) < WfD(a) < WfH(a). The results of Case 6
directly follow.
Case 7: a > A5
When a > A5, the eat and procreate regimes no longer exist. Indeed, a woman with a wage
equal to zero (or equivalently, having the maximum number of children) would consume
more than cm. This implies that only Regimes VI, IX and XI potentially exist. Under As-
sumption 2, WfF (a) <WfI (a) <WfH(a). For wf <W
f
F (a), U(c
f
XI, c
m
XI
, nXI) > U(c
f
IX, c
m
IX
, nIX).
By continuity, we know that for wf =WfF (a), U(cfVI, cmVI, nVI) > U(cfIX, cmIX, nIX) (which is why
we know that WfF (a) < WfH(a)). This implies that for wf ∈ [W
f
F (a),WfH(a)], Regime VI
prevails, while for wf >Wf
H
(a), Regime IX prevails.
C Simulation and Robustness
C.1 Computation of the Standard Errors
Two methods are used in the literature to obtain the standard errors of parameters estimated
by the simulated method of moments: bootstrapping and the delta method. The static
nature of the model makes the bootstrapping method preferable to the delta method which
is usually faster but tends to underestimate the standard errors. We first drew 200 random
new samples with replacement from the original data. The new bootstrap samples were the
same size as the original one (1,127,080 observations) but the frequency of each observation
changed. For each of these new datasets we generated the 48 moments and estimated the
corresponding parameters. We then computed the standard error of these estimators. By
doing so, the uncertainty surrounding our estimated parameters cames exclusively from the
uncertainty around the estimated moments. The results are reported in Column (2) of
Table 11, and in Table 2 of the main text.
We expected the uncertainty coming from the randomness of the artificial population used
to simulate the model to be minimal with a large enough T (typically T = 100, 000 per
education category). To check this expectation we also provide in Column (1) of Table 11
the parameters when the only uncertainty comes from the model: that is when we estimate
the parameters 200 times using the same empirical moments but drawing different households
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Model only (1) Data only (2) Both (3)
mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e.
σa 0.312 0.0087 0.312 0.0098 0.313 0.0098
ma 0.849 0.0096 0.848 0.0109 0.849 0.0113
ν 6.687 0.1138 6.683 0.1090 6.674 0.1238
cm 0.311 0.0036 0.311 0.0046 0.311 0.0048
µ 0.328 0.0065 0.328 0.0066 0.328 0.0076
θ 0.574 0.0066 0.574 0.0082 0.574 0.0082
α 0.596 0.0033 0.597 0.0041 0.597 0.0040
φ 0.224 0.0024 0.224 0.0022 0.225 0.0025
η 0.201 0.0077 0.201 0.0081 0.201 0.0087
Table 11: Mean and Standard Errors of Parameters
from the distribution. Column (3) of Table 11 presents the parameters when we combine
both uncertainties, using the empirical moments from the bootstrap samples and drawing
different households from the distribution. The difference between Columns (2) and (3) is
very small.
C.2 Identified Parameters for Subsamples
Identification by Races. In the main text we have assumed an homogeneous marriage market.
Here we assume instead that there are fragmented markets for each race separately (see
Appendix A.6 for how the groups are constructed). We therefore reestimate the parameters
for each race independently. The results are provided in Table 12.
Black fathers are characterized by a lower involvement in childrearing and a lower fixed cost
of having children. Non-labor income is less dispersed for Whites and more dispersed for
Hispanics.
Identification Removing Disabled. Since 83.5% of single childless women with no schooling
are disabled, we also identify the parameters of the model after removing the disabled from
the data. We can check that the cm parameter still plays a role, even though its estimated
value is lower. The results without the disabled are shown in Table 13.
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Parameter All Blacks Whites Natives Asians Hispanics
(1,127,080) (71,022) (967,315) (6,051) (26,193) (56,064)
σa 0.312 0.320 0.198 0.203 0.200 0.488
ma 0.848 0.868 0.914 0.950 0.896 0.865
ν 6.683 6.857 7.973 7.423 7.458 7.511
cm 0.311 0.334 0.404 0.327 0.334 0.275
µ 0.328 0.395 0.169 0.363 0.321 0.242
θ 0.574 0.429 0.750 0.551 0.541 0.586
α 0.597 0.835 0.391 0.676 0.628 0.656
φ 0.224 0.196 0.242 0.206 0.219 0.214
η 0.201 0.116 0.159 0.177 0.201 0.117
Table 12: Identified Parameters by Race
Parameter “All” Without “disabled”
σa 0.312 0.286
⋆
ma 0.848 0.867
ν 6.683 6.708
cm 0.311 0.263
⋆
µ 0.328 0.320
θ 0.574 0.543⋆
α 0.597 0.577⋆
φ 0.224 0.227
η 0.201 0.205
⋆ indicates a significant difference from “all”.
Table 13: Identified Parameters Without the “Disabled”
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C.3 Changes in the Time Allocation Parameter α
In our model we have assumed that the share mothers (α) and fathers (1 − α) devote to
childrearing is constant across education groups and over time. Bianchi et al. (2004) show
that the ratio of married mothers’ to married fathers’ time in child care declined between the
mid-1960s and the late 1990s, which could be an indication that either social norms changed
for all education categories, or that the increase in the education of women makes it optimal
for fathers to spend more time with their children.
To have some insights on the role of α we carried out the following two experiments. First,
fixing α = 1 instead of identifying it from the cross sectional data, and re-estimating the
rest of the parameters, we find that the quality of the match is lower: the model becomes
unable to reproduce (a) a reasonable marriage rate (especially for highly educated women
who have lost their incentive to marry), (b) childlessness rates for highly educated married
women (for whom the cost of raising children becomes extremely high so they have more
incentives to be voluntarily childless), (c) the gap between the fertility of married mothers
and that of single mothers, who now face the same opportunity cost. Hence, allowing α < 1
is important to generate the nice features of the model.
Second, consider that couples set α optimally under the constraint α ∈ [1/2, 1]. A full-
fledged model with proper bargaining on α would be the topic of another paper; however, a
simple benchmark would be to assume the following rule:
α =

1 if w
f < wm
1/2 if wf ≥ wm.
With this specification the marriage rates are reasonable, the U-shaped relationship between
childlessness and education of married women is preserved, but the model fails in reproducing
the high fertility of poorly educated married mothers (by about one child for the two lowest
education categories), as poor married mothers face almost the same incentives as poor single
mothers. Otherwise, the simple ad-hoc rule above does rather well, which indicates that
bargaining over α could be a promising extension. Finally, we also tried to make α depend
on the education of the mother, independently of the education of the father: α = 1−wf/2.
The properties of this simulation are similar to those in the previous case.
C.4 Fit of the Completed Fertility for Husbands
We compare here the simulated fertility of husbands to data.
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Figure 19: Completed Fertility of Husbands, by Education Categories. Data (black) and
Simulation (grey)
C.5 Assortative Matching
The number of marriages by education category are given in Table 14. This table is con-
structed in the following way: first, we drop from the data all the individuals who are not
married (MARST > 1) or who do not have an identified partner in the Census (SPLOC= 0).
Then, we sort observations, first, by their serial number, corresponding to the household,
and then by their sex, so that the man of the household comes before his wife in the data.
We then generate a variable saying that the husband has a corresponding wife after him (the
serial number for both has to be the same). The last step is to generate a variable with the
education of the husband and another variable with the education of the wife.
The ratio
z(i, j)∑
j z(i, j)
gives the proportion of men of type j having married a woman of type i. Dividing this
number by the proportion of women of type i in the total population,
∑
i z(i, j)∑
i,j z(i, j)
,
we obtain the data in Table 15. Each cell gives, for each married man, his increased chances
marrying a woman in a given category of education, compared with a purely random match-
ing framework. If there was no assortativeness, all the cells would equal 1. The first cell
means that a man of Category 1 has 57 times more chances of marrying a woman of ed-
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ucation Category 1 than in the case of pure random matching. We are able to compute
similar statistics with the simulated data, at the bottom of the table. In the simulation we
also have some assortative matching, although lower than in the data. Regressing each cell
in the top part of the table on the corresponding cell in the bottom part leads to an R2 of
0.217 meaning that we are able to account for 21.7% of the variations in the assortativeness
matching.
To assess the influence of having abstracted from exogenous assortative matching on the
estimated parameters, we conducted the following exercise. Assume that a share λ of the
population draws a potential spouse from his/her education category. The remaining share
1− λ draws his/her partner randomly from the whole population. For different values of λ,
we reestimate the parameters, minimizing the same objective as before. Table 16 presents
the results. The case λ = 0 refers to the benchmark case of Table 2.
Most parameters are not much affected by the introduction of assortative matching. The
parameter which seems to be the most sensitive to λ is α, the share of wives involved in
childrearing. The simulated moments are also quite insensitive to the choice of λ. The value
of λ which minimizes the objective function is around 0.3 - 0.4 (remember that we did not
try to fit marriage data in the objective function). For λ = 0.3, we obtain the marriage
matrix presented in Table 17. We conclude that introducing some exogenous assortative
matching, captured by λ > 0, allows us to get much closer to the observed assortativeness,
without modifying the estimated parameters or the ability of the model to reproduce the
targeted empirical moments very much.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 71,179 13,086 17,869 3,842 2,971 1,751 13,915 4,122 1,630 1,431 988 332
2 14,465 68,397 53,512 7,801 5,114 3,638 18,566 5,054 1,398 1,543 778 104
3 26,113 98,004 472,453 79,705 72,697 43,995 229,332 58,307 14,805 14,369 7,674 1,004
4 6,114 23,070 135,612 88,745 53,731 34,170 151,668 38,420 7,745 8,634 3,924 560
5 6,353 22,146 159,403 69,339 132,115 62,352 282,405 75,275 16,301 18,667 7,760 1,026
6 4,745 15,159 125,973 58,541 83,086 94,623 256,444 73,902 14,284 17,530 7,061 1,066
7 23,125 49,898 565,508 264,819 380,715 300,185 3,455,022 1,261,526 283,977 595,232 251,575 28,998
8 4,840 8,097 92,315 48,220 71,447 57,596 672,543 837,035 159,921 525,637 300,613 44,805
9 1,337 2,726 23,806 12,216 17,571 15,488 186,588 169,093 98,724 188,244 125,071 16,869
10 1,245 2,095 17,462 8,040 12,546 11,090 170,890 209,703 56,760 548,646 445,586 86,506
11 916 1,519 11,343 5,403 8,345 7,326 96,804 105,051 28,313 180,051 292,392 87,314
12 146 63 575 231 374 234 3,409 3,883 1,541 9,598 17,766 22,918
Table 14: Marriages per Education Category. Men in Columns, Women in Rows.
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Men education category
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Data
1 57.233 5.553 1.377 0.767 0.456 0.357 0.324 0.187 0.307 0.088 0.087 0.147
2 8.584 21.421 3.043 1.149 0.580 0.548 0.319 0.169 0.194 0.070 0.051 0.034
3 2.499 4.950 4.332 1.893 1.329 1.069 0.636 0.315 0.332 0.105 0.081 0.053
4 1.185 2.359 2.518 4.268 1.989 1.681 0.852 0.421 0.352 0.127 0.084 0.060
5 0.797 1.466 1.916 2.159 3.166 1.986 1.027 0.534 0.479 0.178 0.107 0.071
6 0.675 1.138 1.717 2.067 2.258 3.418 1.058 0.594 0.476 0.190 0.110 0.084
7 0.332 0.378 0.777 0.943 1.043 1.093 1.437 1.023 0.955 0.650 0.397 0.229
8 0.184 0.162 0.335 0.454 0.517 0.554 0.739 1.794 1.421 1.517 1.253 0.936
9 0.167 0.180 0.285 0.378 0.419 0.491 0.675 1.192 2.886 1.788 1.715 1.160
10 0.085 0.075 0.114 0.136 0.163 0.192 0.338 0.808 0.906 2.846 3.337 3.248
11 0.119 0.104 0.141 0.174 0.207 0.241 0.364 0.770 0.861 1.779 4.170 6.242
12 0.257 0.059 0.097 0.101 0.126 0.105 0.174 0.387 0.636 1.287 3.441 22.248
Simulation
1 1.165 1.116 1.079 1.060 1.044 1.006 0.993 0.981 0.969 0.961 0.960 0.952
2 1.127 1.087 1.059 1.042 1.027 1.009 1.001 0.990 0.978 0.966 0.954 0.909
3 1.100 1.061 1.044 1.034 1.028 1.016 1.007 0.999 0.992 0.964 0.938 0.893
4 1.074 1.046 1.037 1.022 1.019 1.013 1.005 1.000 0.996 0.972 0.954 0.918
5 1.055 1.041 1.028 1.015 1.015 1.011 1.004 0.999 0.996 0.977 0.966 0.935
6 1.038 1.031 1.020 1.010 1.009 1.007 1.002 0.999 0.997 0.985 0.978 0.954
7 1.014 1.016 1.011 1.006 1.004 1.005 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.994 0.992 0.975
8 0.987 0.993 0.996 0.996 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.001 1.002 1.009 1.008
9 0.961 0.972 0.982 0.988 0.994 0.995 0.996 1.000 1.003 1.014 1.026 1.038
10 0.892 0.912 0.939 0.966 0.974 0.979 0.991 1.007 1.010 1.043 1.067 1.149
11 0.834 0.867 0.909 0.946 0.954 0.967 0.988 1.009 1.021 1.066 1.100 1.208
12 0.669 0.740 0.792 0.845 0.880 0.909 0.957 1.008 1.061 1.180 1.263 1.557
Table 15: Assortative Matching
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λ 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
f(p) 45.905 45.220 42.268 41.243 40.669 54.786
σa 0.312 0.298 0.292 0.294 0.297 0.289
ma 0.848 0.851 0.846 0.892
⋆ 0.882⋆ 0.822⋆
ν 6.683 6.585 6.719 6.405⋆ 6.324⋆ 6.499
cm 0.311 0.303 0.291
⋆ 0.278⋆ 0.233⋆ 0.287⋆
µ 0.328 0.330 0.332 0.323 0.326 0.327
θ 0.574 0.583 0.578 0.613⋆ 0.635⋆ 0.637⋆
α 0.597 0.584⋆ 0.546⋆ 0.497⋆ 0.461⋆ 0.616⋆
φ 0.224 0.224 0.223 0.236⋆ 0.236⋆ 0.224
η 0.201 0.217 0.209 0.221⋆ 0.223⋆ 0.230⋆
⋆ indicates a significant difference from the case λ = 0.
Table 16: Identified Parameters for λ between 0 and 0.5
Men’s education category
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 27.963 0.746 0.731 0.708 0.703 0.692 0.683 0.670 0.657 0.594 0.555 0.456
2 0.753 18.376 0.736 0.710 0.709 0.702 0.692 0.678 0.66 0.599 0.562 0.463
3 0.735 0.735 4.044 0.710 0.711 0.705 0.694 0.686 0.673 0.624 0.590 0.495
4 0.722 0.724 0.729 9.304 0.707 0.701 0.697 0.692 0.689 0.645 0.614 0.524
5 0.712 0.721 0.726 0.705 7.066 0.703 0.698 0.694 0.691 0.654 0.627 0.542
6 0.700 0.710 0.721 0.701 0.706 9.031 0.699 0.697 0.694 0.667 0.643 0.566
7 0.691 0.700 0.715 0.698 0.702 0.700 1.657 0.699 0.700 0.678 0.659 0.590
8 0.682 0.689 0.709 0.691 0.697 0.697 0.699 2.503 0.705 0.691 0.677 0.625
9 0.656 0.679 0.697 0.682 0.691 0.693 0.698 0.703 7.709 0.703 0.696 0.667
10 0.622 0.640 0.663 0.663 0.678 0.685 0.693 0.705 0.72 3.256 0.736 0.743
11 0.605 0.605 0.641 0.646 0.665 0.676 0.688 0.701 0.721 0.742 4.452 0.802
12 0.479 0.501 0.537 0.566 0.582 0.612 0.640 0.672 0.718 0.787 0.829 23.491
Table 17: Simulated Marriage Matrix for λ = 0.3
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C.6 Increase in Inequality
Here we draw the evolution of simulated childlessness rates for alternative levels of inequality.
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Figure 20: Childlessness Rate for Different Levels of Inequality (Mincer Coefficient) - Married
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